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Abstract 
 
 
The relations between Turkey and the European Union has been a long subject of 
discussion. Not least due to the fact Turkey has been pursuing an active policy for 
membership for over two decades and if its application is accepted, it would become 
the first Muslim member of the EU. This research will provide some insight into the 
development of Turkey’s application by exploring the problems faced during the first 
years of submitting the request. The positioning of Turkey shall be elucidated upon to 
provide a full picture of the importance of Turkey’s place in regional and international 
politics. A brief comparison with Greece will be discussed so as to further display the 
candidacy of Turkey. Directly addressing the benefits of Turkey joining the EU will 
show the impact the country can have in building bridges whilst strengthening the 
economic and military aspect of the EU. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the development of Turkey’s application to 
become a member of the European Union (EU) and its surrounding controversies. In 
Turkey’s drive to become Western, after having joined the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), it also began to become more European and this was first 
established in 1959 when the European Economic Community (EEC) accepted 
Turkey as an Associate member. The slow progress towards becoming a full member 
has continued since 1987 when the official application was made, but over twenty 
years later that status has still to be achieved notwithstanding the earlier admittance of 
Greece, Spain and Portugal (the 'Med Club') in the 1980s and the more recent 
enlargement to embrace former members of the Soviet bloc, all of which had serious 
deficiencies and yet gained admittance. The reason for researching about this specific 
EU member applicant is due to the obvious fact Turkey is the first Muslim country to 
seek full membership and yet conversely this is also the reason why negotiations with 
the EU have been so protracted and conditional. The many sceptics who have 
concluded the EU is a ‘Christian club’ and those who have anticipated a clash of 
civilisations will soon be put to the test.1 The hopefuls who do not adhere to the 
‘Christian culture’ mentality will also be tested through the response the EU gives to 
Turkey after negotiations are concluded.  
 
With so many unique qualities possessed by Turkey, such as it being politically 
secular in outlook, whilst being a majority Muslim country situated in a strategic 
                                                 
1 Huntington, 1996, 184  
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region with burgeoning economic prowess, it will be interesting how this journey 
ends. This is especially due to the current situation in the EU, since after the recent 
enlargements, it is now experiencing a period of self-assessment; thus the EU’s 
further reaction towards Turkey’s ongoing application will be carefully planned. I 
hope to explore several key areas. Firstly, I will attempt to explain the situation 
Turkey is facing by way of laying out the problems of the past because the heritage of 
the distant past (associated with the Ottoman Empire's near conquest of Europe until 
its forces were halted at Vienna) and more recent past (especially the Armenian 
massacres and the invasion of Cyprus) has influenced the reception towards its 
prospective entry from EU member states, especially Austria, France and Germany. 
This will be explored in Chapter I entitled ‘Turkey’s difficult case for membership’ 
which will analyse why Turkey’s application process has become the longest in the 
EU’s history. In Chapter II titled, ‘Turkey and the world around it’, the positioning of 
Turkey will be discussed. This will include the geostrategic and political importance 
that Turkey has established as a stable regional power sandwiched between the 
conflict torn Balkans and the Middle East. The chapter will also explore the recent 
developments that have led Turkey to become stronger and more aware of the impact 
it can have in politics within the Middle East and further afield. To assess Turkey’s 
application in its real context, a comparison with neighbouring Greece’s journey to 
becoming an EU member shall be considered. Thus Chapter III, titled ‘Greece leads 
the way’, will be a well suited comparison as the two countries share many similar 
qualities while also differing in some key respects. The final chapter, ‘The Prospects 
of Turkey entering the EU’, will assess the current progress Turkey is making. The 
chapter will explore the benefits Turkey has to offer in its own right as well as the 
benefits it can provide for the EU.  
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 During this research, several questions have arisen which will be answered through 
the following chapters. Naturally the most important question is ‘Will Turkey enter 
the European Union?’  Although the question seems to demand an automatic and 
simple yes, this is not the case, as shall be explored later. The second question ‘If yes, 
then when?’ will explain the difficulties that face Turkey in progressing with ease and 
swiftness.  A third question, considering all the consequences and pondering: ‘Should 
Turkey become a member of the EU’? Conversely, ‘Should the EU accept Turkey as a 
full member?’ These questions have no short answer and no answer can be complete 
or correct in totality. The ‘facts’ are never clear and information can be used to build a 
strong case for rejecting or accepting Turkey. This will be discussed in the conclusion, 
bringing all aspects of Turkey’s application to light and assessing its case as fairly as 
possible.  
 
In terms of sources the thesis naturally draws heavily from EU publications, which 
provide essential data such as the conditions for accession, negotiation chapters as 
well as explaining the process of decision making. Reports from the Economic 
Commission and reports on Turkey’s progress have also been key primary sources in 
ascertaining the official stance of the EU. The opinion of independent member states 
as well as the views of independent analysts has also been taken into consideration. 
Because the controversies surrounding Turkey's membership application date from the 
1980s, a considerable secondary literature is available. My research has also therefore 
explored the older views held by political commentators, whether pro-Turkey or anti-
Turkey. These have been included in the analysis to provide an encompassed 
understanding of Turkey’s protracted progress towards membership. 
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 The approach is to explore Turkey’s development over the past forty years from a 
historical, legal and social aspect. This will help provide a better picture of how 
Turkey has progressed and changed as a country, with its legal institutions beginning 
to reflect the needs its modernising society now demands. The move away from top-
down rule to bottom up reform has greatly impacted relations with the EU as well as 
the speed of progress in its application. Thus I will reflect upon these changes and 
explain how they are relevant specifically to the EU application and this will enable a 
more informed conclusion to be reached as to the questions posed. 
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I 
TURKEY’S DIFFICULT CASE FOR EU MEMBERSHIP 
 
The reasons that have hindered Turkey’s hopes of entering the EU can be seen in two 
ways. Firstly, there are long term problems of the past, dating from the early Republic 
such as the strong military presence within Turkish politics. The influence of the 
military has consistently been a key consideration influencing the EU’s cautious 
approach towards Turkish membership. There are also long standing reasons that have 
stumbled Turkey’s progression, such as the issue of the treatment of the Kurdish 
peoples in its South-Eastern region. Whilst the Kurdish situation must be dealt with 
appropriately, it does not itself present an important reason to halt accession. The 
second way to interpret Turkey’s accession prospects is by assessing the issues 
surrounding them as being integral or superficial. Thus, some may argue that the 
human rights situation in Turkey is a superficial obstacle, as similar situations can be 
observed in many existing and recently admitted EU member states, with little 
pressure on them to improve and uphold basic human rights before being granted 
accession. Integral reasons could be viewed as situations that have not changed or 
have become more important, such as the geo-strategic positioning of Turkey. The 
weight of certain problems can increase according to the importance that is placed 
upon them. Thus a changing trend can be observed, beginning in the 1960s with the 
military being a central concern, along with unstable politics, the Kurdish problem 
and the Cyprus issue arising from Turkey’s invasion of the North of Cyprus in 1974. 
The economy, the Cold War situation and human rights infringements are short term 
reasons that prevented progress at the time. The attitude of Greece an EU member 
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since 1981 has remained an important consideration in Turkey’s case for accession, 
although recently Greece has become a favoured friend within the region. The key 
reasons as well as the superficial problems will be assessed to provide a clear analysis 
of Turkey’s bumpy road to accession. 
 
Military Interventions Since the Early Republic 
The Paris Conference in 1856 placed Turkey firmly within the European sphere 
despite the fact that the rest of Europe shares a memory of being united against the 
‘terrible Turk’.1 Due to this unavoidable truth, Turkey has since continued to create a 
new perception of itself by welcoming modernisation for the purpose of 
‘Europeanisation’.2 With this, Mustafa Kemal sought to move away from its Ottoman 
past by combining modernist tenets for socio-economic change in a charismatic 
manner.3 This top-down approach created a modern Turkey that was isolated from its 
people.4 This environment needed to be protected and controlled; a responsibility 
assumed by the military of Turkey. They exercised their power whenever they felt the 
Kemalist principles were being threatened, thus showing the weakness upon which 
democratisation was progressing. In 1946 a multi-party system began, with hopes of 
full democracy taking root. The 1950s saw the Democratic right party come to power, 
and though it was pro-Kemalist in principle, it was less harsh on peasants and on 
religion.5 The coup of 1960 represented the power and the extent to which the 
military were to intervene in politics. Organised by the Junta, the coup initiated a new 
commission named the National Unity Commission, with hand-picked intellectuals to 
                                                 
1 Paris Conference, 1856, 20 
2 Bac, 1999, 243 
3 Sunar, 1996, 141-142 
4 Sunar, 1996, 143 
5 Dodd, 1996, 132 
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show the way forward.6 The military ensured its involvement within the political 
sphere by creating a National Security Council, which advised the Cabinet.7 This 
heavy handed approach led to instability and “parties and leaders now wooed the 
generals”.8 The coup of 1971 followed to restrict the freedom of and ensure checks on 
leftist parties, which led to the assassinations of public figures.9 The 1970s saw much 
regional violence and state terrorism, and because of this liberalism was not able to 
flourish due to the pull of these past events.10 Bureaucracy and administration 
remained rigid and the continuous fractured governments feared intervention by the 
military.11 The EU’s conditions for enlargement clearly states, “Any European 
country which respects the principles of…the rule of law may apply to become a 
member of the Union.”12 Yet in the Turkish case democracy was only to continue so 
long as it conformed to the Kemalist principle and the military approved. 
                                                
Kurds ‘Disrupting’ Homogeneity 
During the Ottoman Empire, people’s status was based upon confessional lines and 
not their race or ethnicity.13 The Kurdish issue arose due to the fact the Turkish 
Republic is based upon ethnic lines, with the hope of creating unity through 
homogeneity. Before the states such as Iraq and Turkey were formed, the Kurdish 
people moved freely, but after the formation of these states, each country attempted to 
embrace them.14 As the countries formed on the basis of power, Turkey embraced 
 
6 Ahmed, 2003, 119-120 
7 Dodd, 1996, 131 
8 Ahmed, 2003, 124 
9 Dodd, 1996, 133 
10 Onic, 1996, 148-149 
11 Bachard, 1998, 13-14 
12 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm (accessed 14 
April 2010) 
13 Spencer, 1993, 3 
14 Park, 2005, 11 
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almost twenty percent of all Kurds, thus presenting a problem for decades to come.15 
In the 1920s a separate state for the Kurdish people was briefly entertained as a 
reward for the joint Muslim battle against the Greeks, though this was quickly dashed 
by Mustafa Kemal.16 He interpreted this notion as an attempt by the USA and others 
to weaken the new Republic through civil turmoil and separatism.17 The Republic 
ensured its own protection through the constitution, which defined Turks by place of 
living, religion and ethnicity.18 Thus, Mustafa Kemal was able to eliminate any legal 
reference to the Kurdish people and with this he imposed martial law, banned the 
Kurdish language and began his secular Turkification.19 In 1925 the Kurdish people 
rebelled against these new laws, only to be harshly suppressed by the Turkish armed 
forces.20 As Cagaptay states, “High Kemalism had made the Kurds into obedient yet 
inactive members of the Republic.”21 The new wave of secularism was partly enjoyed 
by the Kurds, some of whom were from the religious minority of Alevi Muslims and 
so the elimination of Sunni Islam in public life gave them greater religious freedom.22  
In the 1960s, there was a resurgence with the Kurds demanding more cultural freedom 
and regional investment.23 The elite believed they could suppress their voices through 
military action24 but this time the Turkish forces were beginning to suffer greatly.25 In 
1984, the Kurdish movement became systematically militarised under the name of the 
PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party); a creation of Turkish miscalculation that would lead 
                                                 
15 Park, 2005, 14 
16 Treaty of Sevres, 1920, 807 
17 Park, 2005, 13 
18 Cagaptay, 2006, 159 
19 Park, 2005, 17 
20 Pope, 1997,  249 
21 Pope, 1997, 113 
22 Spencer, 1993, 3 
23 Ahmed, 2003, 163 
24 Ahmed, 2003, 163 
25 Cagaptay, 2006, 112 
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them further away from their EU dreams.26 Almost one quarter of the Turkish land 
forces were being used to fight the guerrilla group, but soon the issue became 
internationalised and the world now took interest.27 Local villages were being paid to 
break the PKK’s camouflage tactic of hiding in villages.28 The new European concern 
became manifest in 1989 with the first international conference on the Kurdish 
question in Paris.29 It was estimated over a 15 year period that more than 37,000 
people were killed and in 1997 Jacques Pour, the Luxembourg foreign minister, saw 
the Kurdish problem as a major issue hindering Turkey’s accession bid.30 
 
The EU did not support the actions of the PKK, but it did question the excessive force 
that was being used by Turkey to suppress this internal struggle.31 There were 
attempts to settle the situation on a semi-official level. However the Ocalan affair 
worsened any possibility of this.32 Italy and Syria had been accused of supporting and 
protecting the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and through pressure from Ankara, Syria 
caught Ocalan and handed him over to Turkey.33 The ensuing death sentence was to 
be carried out but international pressure led the case to be put before the European 
Court of Justice and Ocalan was spared.34 Such international intervention annoyed 
Turkey as it felt it was being attacked without anyone understanding the situation it 
was facing.35 Turkey was not denying the existence of the Kurdish people but did not 
want to privilege them with minority status,36 as some far right secularists feared the 
                                                 
26 Pope, 1997,  251 
27 Kramer, 2000, 37-38 
28 Ahmed, 2003, 165 
29 Pope, 1997,  264 
30 Langhorne, 1996,  20 
31 Kramer, 1996, 221 
32 Itzkowitz, 1994, 239 
33 Ahmed, 2003, 165-166 
34 Ahmed, 2003, 166 
35 Itzkowitz, 1994, 207 
36 Kramer, 1996,  220 
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end of a unified Turkey.37 The 1990s saw a breakthrough for Turkish politics as 
President Ozal reversed the law that banned the Kurdish language.38 By 1995, the 
overtly Kurdish People’s Democracy party was formed, but it did not vie for a 
separate state nor did it support the PKK.39 The urban elite within Turkey have begun 
to understand the Kurdish plight for ethnic recognition,40 which is positive for internal 
cohesion and the EU bid. New legislation has allowed the Kurdish language to be 
spoken but the new anti-terror law has limited freedom of speech.41  
 
Regional Issues: Cyprus 
Another problem that is facing Turkey in its bid for accession is the longstanding 
issue of Cyprus. Cyprus is a strategically important island as the British realised and 
hence annexed it from the Ottomans after the First World War, which was recognised 
in the Lausanne treaty.42 In 1950, the Greek Cypriots sought independence from 
Britain seeking Enosis with Greece.43 Over several years a guerrilla army fought the 
occupying forces, eventually forcing Britain to concede independence albeit by 
retaining two sovereign bases in perpetuity.44 After negotiations in London between 
Turkey, Greece and Britain, the Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960.45 The 
uneasy relationship of the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios as President and the 
Turkish Cypriot, Dr.Fazil Kucuk as vice-president soon began to break down.46 
Sanctions on Turkish Cypriot areas47 and the planned coup in 1974 led to tensions, 
                                                 
37 Kramer, 2000,  43 
38 Bac, 1999,  250 
39 Pope, 1997,  255 
40 Itzkowitz, 1994, 52 
41 Pope, 1997, 266 
42 Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, 966 
43 Itzkowitz, 1994, 126 
44 Holland, 1998, 307 
45 Ahmed, 2003, 129 
46 Ahmed, 2003, 129 
47 Itzkowitz, 1994, 129 
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though it could be said the North invasion presented an opportunity for Turkey to 
balance out the power struggle. As a guarantor of the 1959 tripartite treaty, Turkey 
believed it had the right to intervene after Britain rejected assistance in intervention.48 
In July, Turkish President Bulent Ecevit ordered the invasion and the Turkish army 
took control of 40% of the island.49 This situation agitated relations with Greece and 
with the rest of the world as it was seen as external aggression. An informal separation 
was created based on geography, with the Greek Cypriots living in the South and the 
Turkish Cypriots residing in the North. The separation was made concrete with the 
creation of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983.50 As Turkey was 
the only country to recognise the new state, some interpreted this move as part of 
Turkey’s expansionist aims within the region. This was made explicit when the 
government in Cyprus was restored and the occupying Turkish troops did not leave.51 
Emigrants from Turkey were encouraged to settle in the north to counterbalance the 
south’s Greek Cypriot community.52 Turkey will continue to aid its fellow Turks as it 
would now lose face and prestige against Greece.  
                                                
 
With the race for accession to the EU, Turkey has been forced to assess its priorities. 
Being an Associate member since 1963 and applying for membership in 1983, the 
case of Cyprus will be a problem. The garrison on the island and the fact Turkey 
helped establish a separate state within Cyprus are issues that need to be dealt with 
according to EU terms. With Cyprus having pushed for membership with the EU 
through an Association Agreement since 1972, Greece stated it would veto any 
 
48 Ahmed, 2003,140 
49 Ahmed, 2003, 141 
50 Itzkowitz, 1994, 150 
51 Bachard, 1998, 36 
52 Emilianides, 2009, 100 
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Eastern European country in its own desire to bring Cyprus into the EU.53 The 
President of the TRNC, Rauf Denktash, led the poorer and under-developed part of 
Cyprus.54 The number of Turkish troops number around 30,000 and there are little 
signs of their leaving due to the mutual suspicion and Greece’s possible attempt to 
militarise the island. From Greece’s point of view, they see Turkey’s attempts to 
dominate the island as a continuation of the Ottoman-Turkish desire to raid and re-
capture Greece.55 Whilst on the other hand, Turkey does seek to resolve the situation 
on its own terms, as economically it is burdening Turkey $200 million per annum to 
keep Northern Cyprus afloat.56 Maintaining the status quo is vital for Turkey if it is to 
exert its strength in the Mediterranean.  
 
On 3rd July 1990, Cyprus applied for EU membership, which quickly led to the 
questioning of the legitimacy of the application.57 Many objections arose such as the 
fact that Cyprus was a bi-communal society and so any decision had to be taken by 
both communities. In addition, Cyprus could not join a ‘union’ Turkey and Greece 
were not part of, and freedom of goods was an unfulfilled requirement.58 However, 
most objections were unfounded; the EU was a loose union which does not conflict 
with the Cyprus constitution and Turkish Cypriots would not join in the EU bid. It is 
important to recognise the implications of granting EU membership to Cyprus; 
permanently dividing the country and continuing the rift between Turkey and Greece, 
and the EU.59 In 1992, progress was made as all sides agreed to work with the United 
                                                 
53 Langhorne, 1996, 36 
54 Pope, 1997, 109-110 
55 Itzkowitz, 1994, 165 
56 Pope, 1997, 124 
57http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/All/33D74C8D5E59FFC8C2256EBD004F3CF4?OpenDo
cument, (accessed 16 September  2010) 
58 http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_b.html (accessed 17 September 2010) 
59 Itzkowitz, 1994, 211 
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Nations for a solution in Cyprus.60 Turkish President Demirel and Greek President 
Mitsokatis were weary of jeopardising their narrow government majority and so acted 
cautiously.61 A loose federation was one solution offered, as it kept the bi-zonal 
system but allowed for equality in higher government.62 Though attempts were made 
to unite the island, by 1995, the European Commission ruled accession could take 
place without unification.63 By 1998, the EU had approved the beginning of 
negotiations to which they were concluded just four years later in 2002.64 Cyprus 
became a member of the EU in 2004 which meant another vetoing power against 
Turkey.65 This also means that other EU member states can be directly influenced by 
Cyprus and Greece through the body of the EU. Thus Turkey has become more 
limited in applying pressure as the Greek Cypriots are less affected by Turkish efforts 
to reunite the island since the goal of EU membership has been achieved. 
 
Regional Issues: Greece 
The security and stability of Cyprus would have a direct affect on the security of the 
Mediterranean. It is the meeting point of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, as well 
as being a route for oil pipelines from Iraq to pass through.66 In 1997, the EC-Turkey 
Association Council stated that the dispute between Turkey and Greece needed to be 
resolved, even if that meant settling it in the International Court of Justice.67 For 
Turkey to be given a clearer sign for membership would ensure a better approach on 
                                                 
60 Spencer, 1993, 18 
61 Spencer, 1993, 18-19 
62 Peristianis, 1999, 126-127 
63 Bahcheli, 2004, 109 
64http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/All/33D74C8D5E59FFC8C2256EBD004F3CF4?OpenDo
cument (accessed 24 September 2010) 
65 http://europa.eu/about-eu/member-countries/countries/member-states/cyprus/index_en.htm (accessed 
24 September 2010) 
66 Itzkowitz, 1994, 175 
67 Bac, 1999, 256 
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the issue of Cyprus, and for the EU this would mean stability in the region.68 The 
referendum in 2004 to decide the future of Cyprus, as to whether the people wished 
for unification, found the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan proposal with 75.8% 
voting no, whilst 65% of voting Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan.69 Greece had 
consistently vetoed any decision of the EU in the hope of forcing the EU to give in 
and promise negotiations with Cyprus.70 
 
The recent controversy surrounding Turkey refusing to open its ports to Cyprus for 
trade in 2006 was another bad move for Turkey as it led to a freeze on accession 
talks.71 The European Commission concluded that it would “monitor Ankara’s 
progress on opening ports to Cyprus in 2007, 2008, 2009 as appropriate”.72 This 
confirms the viewpoint that Turkey’s chances of joining the EU will improve 
according to the state of its relations with its neighbours. Although it can be argued 
this is unfair and not according to any specific law within the EU charter, Greece has 
been able to use this advantage and sway the debate to rest the blame upon Turkey. 
When asked about the Cyprus issue, President Gul said he felt frustrated, reiterating 
the viewpoint of the Turkish Cypriots of feeling cheated.73 Some have criticised the 
movement of the new AKP (Justice Party) as being indecisive in its position on 
Cyprus. The report written by the European Parliament by Camiel Eurlings in 2006 
left a bitter taste in Turkey, as it laid the onus on them to reform in many aspects.74 
 
                                                 
68 Theophanous, 1999, 183 
69 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3656753.stm (accessed 16 September 010) 
70 Guney, 2005, 287 
71 www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-freeze-talks-on-turkey-membership-428085.html 
(accessed 9 January 2010) 
72 www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-freeze-talks-on-turkey-membership-428085.html 
(accessed 9 January 2010) 
73 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1868084.ece (accessed 9 January 2010) 
74 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=A6-2006-
0269&type=REPORT (accessed 16 September 2010) 
 14
The relationship between Greece and Turkey has been bitter for most of their history. 
It can be said much of this is based upon the way the two states formed. Greece had 
been part of the Ottoman Empire under the millet system, which was used to protect 
the various religious minorities.75 The notion of nationalism rose in the Greek people 
from the Western world, who forced upon them the concept of Hellenism and being 
heirs of the Byzantine Empire.76 The Greeks embraced this new identity and used it to 
exaggerate the misrule of the Ottomans, thus inciting rebellion.77 In 1831 the Greek 
national state was founded, and since then Greek history books begin with the war for 
independence and the revival of the Megali idea.78 The two greatest blows to Greece 
have been in 1922 when the Greeks lost heavily against the Turks and during the 1974 
invasion of Cyprus.79 Furthermore, the Treaty of Lausanne officially categorised the 
Greeks in Turkey as a minority and forced an exchange of populations, thus crushing 
any idea of a Greater Greece.80 All this has led to a crisis in Greek identity and an 
inevitable nationalistic confrontation with Turkey, who had been portrayed as the 
aggressor.81 The armed conflicts that took place in 1912, 1918 and in 1920-22 sealed 
the possibility of reconciliation and increased the concept of ‘the other’.82 There was 
a rapprochement engineered by Venizelos but this was shattered when Turkey stood 
aside when Nazi Germany invaded Greece. Many of the Greek novels are often based 
upon stereotypical views of the Turks, with many stories featuring the Turk taking 
‘our’ women.83 This type of literature has led to a group psychology but on an 
                                                 
75 Millas, 2004, 57 
76 Itzkowitz, 1994, 178 
77 Millas, 2004, 55 
78 Millas, 2004, 54 
79 Itzkowitz, 1994, 184 
80 Treaty of Lausanne, 1923,  973 
81 Aydin, 2004, 23 
82 Heraclides, 2004,  67 
83 Millas, 2004, 57 
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individual basis interactions are better.84 Thus those who are in power often determine 
the outlook that will be created.85  
 
The main reason for the hostility apart from historical tensions lay in the Aegean; 
namely air space, territorial waters, the continental shelf and the islands. These issues 
are important as they present strategic and economic gains and losses.86 With regards 
to the airspace and territorial waters, the contention lies in the theoretical and legal 
application of laws. The 1982 law of the seas dealt with such issues, but had not been 
signed by Turkey.87 The 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation stated the width 
of territorial waters determined the airspace a country legally had.88 Greece had 
claimed ten miles of airspace over its six mile territorial waters; thus Turkey and other 
countries would regularly fly within the six miles of Greece.89 Article 3 of the Law of 
the Sea Convention in 1982 stated twelve miles was the maximum a state could claim 
as territorial waters.90 As Turkey did not sign this convention, Greece has not 
exercised this right and has remained within six miles of its territorial waters.91 
Turkey sees this as unfair as it would severely limit their movement in the Aegean.92 
The EU forced harsh rules upon Turkey, for threatening an EU member’s territorial 
waters.93 The Flight Information Responsibility (FIR) based on the International Civil 
                                                 
84 Itzkowitz, 1994, 172 
85 Millas, 2004, 64 
86 Aydin, 2004, 27 
87 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm (accessed 16 
September 2010) 
88 http://www.icao.int/icaonet/arch/doc/7300/7300_1ed.pdf  (accessed 16 September 2010) 
89 Aydin, 2004, 29 
90 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (accessed 16 
September 2010) 
91 Bahceli, 2004,  99 
92 Itzkowitz, 1994, 167 
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Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has placed the duty on the Greeks, who have been 
accused of watching Turkish movements in the Aegean.94  
 
The issue of the Aegean’s continental shelf is also a heated contention. Turkey has 
been willing to negotiate distribution and at first Greece accepted this, but then 
rejected it calling for the matter to be dealt by the International Court of Justice.95 In 
1987 the dispute nearly led to an outbreak of war, but relations cooled through the 
Davos talks, though the position remained the same.96 As of yet, no oil has been 
found in the Aegean but if it had the quiet disagreement would quickly fire up as both 
countries have not signed a delimitation agreement in maritime borders.97 
 
Dispute has also arisen in regard to the islands scattered around the Aegean. The 
Treaty of Lausanne established that 2,200 islands would be part of Greece, whilst the 
islands closer to Turkey would be in their possession, with the islands east of the 
Aegean being de-militarised for fifty years.98 In 1996, a Turkish cargo vessel passed 
some rocks and this quickly led to both countries laying claim to ownership of the 
rocks.99 Frogmen and troops were sent by both countries, escalating matters till the 
US and NATO intervened and prevented further action.100 Here, the military 
weakness of the EU was clear, as it was unable to calm the nations.101 Since 1996, 
hundreds of islands have become grey areas.102 The placing of s-300 anti-aircraft 
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surface-to-air missiles in Cyprus did not help the situation.103 According to some, 
Turkey is superior in its military capability and is less obsessed about Greece’s 
military capacity, making more attempts at dialogue.104 Furthermore, the fact is 
Greece has many Muslim neighbours; the Turkic connection between them, as shown 
in the 1990s with the Bosnia crisis, has increased their fear.105 Any step to move away 
from the status quo position will be interpreted as appeasement, anti-nationalistic and 
a weakness.106 Thus, Turkey and Greece are forced to continue this game, until their 
people are ready to re-dress their history and engage. 
                                                
 
Turkey’s Economy 
Another reason why the case for Turkey has been set back is the economic position of 
the country. Although currently this reason is less important, during the early stages of 
the EU bid it was an integral impediment as its weak economy was potentially 
destabilising for the EU. The early Republic was still under the influence of Kemalist 
principles such as statism, which placed emphasis on industrial planning which was 
inevitably state run.107 The relationship with foreign states including Great Britain 
was reduced through strict foreign exchange, import controls and high import 
duties.108 This constrained economic progression and by 1957 Turkey faced a 
macroeconomic crisis.109 In 1960, the State Planning Organisation (SPO), chaired by 
the Prime Minister, supervised the economy over a five year period, resulting in an 
economic-political entanglement.110 The labour versus capital argument continued 
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until in the 1970s the military intervened and decided progress was to be made 
through a capitalist way.111 With the onset of Turkish workers moving to Germany for 
industrial work, the manufacturing sector improved whilst the agrarian developed 
more slowly.112 The oil shock in 1973-1974 and the invasion of Cyprus led to the EU 
placing strict sanctions upon Turkey, thus slowing down economic growth and the bid 
for membership.113 The Association Agreement was signed in 1963 and if a Customs 
Union was to follow, Turkey had to abolish its customs duties and align with EU 
policies.114 As Sunar rightly points out, the reforms that have taken place in Turkey 
have often been inconsistent and the pull of past regimes will hinder attempts at 
liberalism.115 The non-performance of some EU policies has meant reduction in only 
two tariffs at ten percent.116 It should be noted that through the 1980s, the state 
subsidy system began to reduce and Turkey pursued an export orientated economic 
policy.117  
 
A key cause of the fluctuation in the Turkish economy has been the imbalance in 
redistributing wealth and reducing rising inflation. For example, the Southeast region 
has always been neglected for political reasons and this lack of development reduced 
investment opportunities and thus increased unemployment.118 The rural workforce 
was much larger than any other workforce and yet income levels were much lower, 
which meant the GDP per capita was still low at $4,260 as compared to Greece 
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$10,960 in 1990.119 As tariff reduction was taking longer to implement as some 
sectors such as automobiles and pharmaceuticals were more difficult to reduce,120 the 
prospect of a Customs Union was being pushed further back. The EU policy changed 
after 1975 as it now had security concerns, and so it introduced a ‘global 
Mediterranean policy’ offering trade concessions.121 As Turkey received less than it 
expected, President Ozal and the businesses exerted efforts towards the Muslim 
world, to show their dissatisfaction.122 The problem of inflation still held Turkey back 
from optimising its economic performance. A key reason for the persistent high 
inflation was due to tax evasion, low taxation123 and inefficiency in the public 
sector.124 The increase of inflation from the 1990s from 50% to 80% by 2003 shows 
the Treasury did not account for all its debt.125 The lack of transparency and 
accountability in debt management will encourage foreign investment, and with the 
new debt law this is positive progress.126 In 1996 the national deficit increased but in 
1997 an increase in exports meant the deficit was reduced.127 Many are waiting for 
Turkey to show a strong commitment and implementation of EU policies.128  
 
Another issue is the integration and competition of Turkish agriculture within EU 
markets. The agriculture sector employs around 26 % of the national work force 
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whilst representing 9% of the GDP.129 The size of Turkey’s GDP and farming sector 
will mean larger funds would be allocated to Turkey, so for example five percent of 
the current GDP of Turkey would lead to €9 billion in structural funds.130 Such vast 
amounts of funds being directed to one country has led to a questioning of whether 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) should be extended to Turkey.  
 
Human Rights 
Another issue faced by Turkey in its bid to become an EU member is of human rights. 
Article six of the EU conditions for enlargement specifies very directly, “The Union 
shall respect...Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 
November 1950.”131 This shows human rights have to be dealt with before Turkey 
can hope for membership. Whilst it may be an insignificant reason for others to see, 
the EU principles are a reflection of collective norms; thus integration of these 
policies can be said to be part of ‘Europeaness.’ For Turkey, the issue of human rights 
is the insecurity Turkey has with itself; any questioning of government actions are 
quickly labelled as being rebellious or pro-Kurdish.132 By the 1980s, Turkey was 
willing to accept scrutiny by the EU as the Balfe report in 1985 discussed the major 
barriers to membership now being moral principles such as maintaining human 
rights.133 Furthermore, a report by the EC in 1999 criticised Turkey’s lack of 
implementation, stating, “There has been no evolution of the situation in Turkey with 
regard to human rights and minority problems.”134 This was a reference to the ‘deep 
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state’135 Turkey continues to deny, as even though the 1982 Constitution  reversed 
many of the freedoms that had been suppressed, those higher up in the government 
did not heed the new laws.136 Many Commission officials recognised the progress that 
had been made but stressed that if Turkey did not address its human rights situation, 
promised aid would not be sent.137 The Turkish Human Rights Association was 
founded in 1986 and since then has gained much international support, and has 
criticised many of the torture techniques committed by the Police force.138 A new 
demand within Turkey led to a full re-dress of the situation and the AKP government 
sought to tackle the issue institutionally, through the police academies, thus breaking 
the circle.139 The number of cases of people dying in Police custody was decreasing 
even though 692 cases were filed in the first six months of 2004.140 Unfortunately, the 
case of human rights being violated is not unique to Turkey but several EU members 
such as Bulgaria and Romania are known to have a bad record too.141 These double 
standards of allowing such countries to enter without penalising or slowly their 
membership process do not encourage Turkey to tackle the issue.142 Thus it can be 
said the issue of human rights is as important as the EU wishes to make it, as 
ultimately no country can completely rid itself of human rights violations. Although 
Turkey paid less attention to human rights during the early years of the EU 
relationship, it has since sought to challenge these discrepancies. This will take time, 
as do all deep-rooted issues, though it would be unfair to hold Turkey back on this 
oint.  
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 To conclude, it is clear there have been several key issues which have prevented 
Turkey from benefiting fully from the EU. The stranglehold of the military in Turkish 
politics has meant a lack of transparency and development in politics and parties 
within Turkey. However, it cannot be said that Turkey stands alone in this dilemma; 
during Greece’s accession period the situation was similar as was the case with Spain 
and Portugal. Thus it does remain an anomaly that Turkey’s military was used to 
retard progress in the EU membership process. With this said, the presence of the 
military has been reduced significantly and Turkish politics has now begun to 
understand the importance of liberal democracy and real unhindered civil leadership. 
The Kurdish issue is also a reason that was a major impediment in the 1980s, mainly 
due to the violent clashes between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces. Though 
support was not unanimous on both sides, this era began to subside and allowed a 
fresh approach to Turkish-Kurdish relations. It must be said, with the relaxation of the 
military presence in politics, Kurdish cultural and political movements have grown 
and the implicit recognition of a separate but equal culture had reduced the possibility 
of violent clashes. Turkey’s human rights record was rightly criticised by the EU and 
inhumane treatment of people held by the police should be condemned. In response to 
open criticism, Turkey attempted to deal with the issue by setting up new watchdogs 
though the challenge of wiping out the deep-state will take much longer. The 
economy in the early period was also weak and an important reason to sour EU-
Turkish relations. However, just as other hopeful states were given financial aid to 
help their transition to liberalising policies, Turkey should have also been a partner. 
That is not to say they received no concessions. However, the extent and lack of 
encouragement up till the 1990s is clear. The success of implementing new policies 
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paid off and Turkey can now boast a booming and varied economy. What remain the 
key issues to preventing Turkey from entering the EU are the situation in Cyprus and 
Turkey’s relations with Greece. The 1974 invasion of Cyprus will not be forgotten by 
the Greek Cypriots and Greece, and the fact Turkey remains firm in its support of the 
TRNC, a state that is not recognised in international law cannot be taken lightly. 
However, prestige is at stake and Turkey will not remove its troops unless an island 
agreement is made, which would no longer happen since the Greek Cypriot part of 
Cyprus has gained the invaluable membership of the EU. The recent relationship with 
Greece has been better than the previous thirty years. Many of the disagreements, 
although not settled, have not been brought to the fore. This is wise politics from both 
sides and since Greece ended its constant veto in 1999, Turkey has progressed in its 
membership with the EU. Thus it seems the previous reasons by which Turkey was 
being halted such as the military, the Kurdish issue, human rights and economics have 
now been submerged. Turkey’s strange obsession with Cyprus and its fluctuating 
relationship with Greece are considerations the EU will take into account before it 
sumes membership talks with Turkey. 
 
re
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II 
 TURKEY AND THE WORLD AROUND IT 
 
This chapter will explore the interaction and relationship between Turkey and the 
Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. It is important to understand the 
influences from the pre-independence periods of these regional modern states to 
explain the mindset from which these states have chosen to react to situations within 
the region. The historical, political and economic relationship has fluctuated over the 
centuries and recent conflicts have forced open the debate as to the reason for such 
violent outbursts. Whilst some lay the blame on religion, others have pointed to ethnic 
differences, and yet others recount history to provide a more encompassing 
explanation. The chapter will attempt to briefly explain the history of the three regions 
from the Ottoman period up till modern times. The conflicts that have taken place will 
be explored along with the core issues relating to them. The place of Turkey in these 
regions will be analysed to show the motives Turkey is driven by to participate as a 
regional player. Furthermore, this will help us to understand the regional importance 
of Turkey and its true place within the world and especially its relationship with 
Europe. 
 
Ottoman Period 
The presence of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans began from the battle of Kosovo 
Polje in 1389, and despite the end result being a draw, it opened the region to Ottoman 
influence.1 In 1463 and 1482, Bosnia and Herzegovina converted to Islam voluntarily 
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on a mass scale.2 The fact the region was granted full hereditary rights for its nobles, 
shows the importance and respect given on the part of the Ottomans.3 In 1528, 
Croatia was also incorporated and the region was given much autonomy with regards 
to its administration and law.4 The fact many Grand Viziers were in general of Balkan 
descent,5 reinforced the relationship between the Sultan and the region, indicating a 
natural affinity due to ethnic similarity. Friedman claims the reason for the weakening 
of Ottoman rule in the Balkans can be explained by the structural problem of non-
Muslim allegiance being re-directed from the Sultan to the Patriarch and local 
administration.6 Rather, the weakness lay in the fact tolerance of different religious 
and ethnic groups was no longer maintained, and with the dawn of ‘nationalism’ these 
lines were drawn harder. With external compromises being made such as with Russia 
in 1774 to give access to the Straits and Black Sea for trade purposes,7 it was clear the 
Ottomans would soon lose their stronghold. As Russia modernised in the nineteenth 
century, it sought expansion at the expense of the Ottomans.8 In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the Balkans had begun to disintegrate into de facto separate states; 
Montenegro, Serbia and Romania claimed independence.9 In 1878 Bulgaria declared 
independence from the Ottoman Empire and Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed 
by the Hapsburg Empire.10 Despite the loss of these states, the cultural Ottoman 
influence on the region was visible and echoed throughout the period to come.11 
 
Twentieth Century-1900-1950 
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During the twentieth century the Balkans was being used in various ways by other 
regional powers to fulfil their own ambitions. The first Balkan war of 1912 instigated 
by Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece (the Balkan League) was an attempt to 
gain independence and territory from the Ottomans.12 The second Balkan (1913) war 
saw the switching of sides with the Ottomans opportunistically joining Serbia, 
Greece, Montenegro and Romania to thwart Bulgaria’s expansionism.13 The 
beginning of World War I meant great chaos and the crumbling Ottoman Empire 
foolishly sided with Germany, eventually being humiliated when the Central Powers 
were defeated in 1918.14 Such an unwise decision further confirmed for the Kemalists 
to break away from the Sultan and establish a new Western style state that later 
became inward looking.15 This meant the new movement was geared towards 
establishing inner security and thus there was less focus on foreign relations. 
 
The new leader of the Turkish people Mustafa Kemal was preoccupied with 
maintaining Anatolia and establishing sovereignty there for Turkey.16 By defeating the 
Greeks, this allowed Russia to dominate Yugoslavia and Albania, for Ataturk believed 
in ‘peace home, peace abroad’, thus he was less interested.17 After the Turco-Soviet 
treaty of 1921, relations between the two states were generally peaceful.18 In 1936, 
Turkey signed the Monteux convention, which principally meant the Straits would be 
open to all maritime powers though Turkey would have first consideration on military 
security.19 By 1939, Stalin began to demand the Straits plus some territory on the 
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borders they shared in the South.20 During the Cold War, the Balkan states were used 
as an inter-bloc between the superpowers, as South-Eastern Europe was an internally 
stable region, though later this changed.21 
 
1950 to the Present 
The dynamic of the Soviet Empire’s bloc was such that the states inside the ‘Union’ 
were denied any nationalist desires until the Empire collapsed. This unnatural 
situation later erupted into a surge of nationalism as is evident in the 1990s, especially 
with the Yugoslavia civil war. The policy of Turkey in this period was one of non-
interest despite the Muslim presence in the Balkans, as Turkey was still coming to 
terms with itself as a new state.22 By the 1980s, Turkey became more interested as the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria were being persecuted on an ethnic basis and forced 
assimilation was taking place.23 The situation in Bulgaria was dire; mosques were 
being closed down and propaganda was spread that Bulgarians had been forced to 
convert to Islam in the centuries before.24 Many Turks had been deported, their land 
confiscated and the Turkish language was banned from being spoken.25 Through 
pressure from Turkey, Bulgaria was forced to re-think its policies as Turkey was in a 
better position to exert influence. Accepting the influx of Turks that fled Bulgaria and 
Turkey demanding rights be given, Bulgaria began to reverse the situation by re-
opening the mosques and lifting the language ban.26 By the early 1990s, Bulgaria was 
progressing in its reform and it was becoming more democratic through new political 
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groups forming such as the MRF (Movement for Rights and Freedom).27 In 1992, 
Bulgaria also agreed to remove its troops from Thrace persuading Turkey to remove 
two of its battalions from the border.28 
 
By this time, Europe had realised its stability was intertwined with that of Eastern 
Europe’s; thus it began to pay attention to the region.29 In 1976, the Balkan 
conference was attended by all the Balkan states except Albania, though little was 
achieved as the recent Cyprus invasion by Turkey led to cautious behaviour by other 
states.30 The situation after the Cold War marked the beginning of a new conflict; this 
time between the Balkan states themselves. The atrocities that took place in former 
Yugoslavia in Serbia’s desire for a greater Serbia shocked the world, though the 
reaction was still divided.31 Thousands fled from the ethnic cleansing, the land was 
ravaged with sixty percent of housing being destroyed.32 The cause for such an 
outburst has been explained in three ways; the first being from the viewpoint of the 
Balkans suggests that nationalist conflicts arose due to the ambitions of external 
powers to exert influence. The second reason was the supposed unavoidable clash of 
civilisations of Islam versus Christianity. The third cause is seen from the West that 
the ‘return of ancestral hatreds’ led to the conflict.33  
 
Turkey saw three options in dealing with the situation: firstly it could directly 
intervene since Bulgaria rejected it permission to enter its territory. Secondly, Turkey 
could remain totally passive, but this was not an option as there was uproar in the 
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country.34 The third possibility was to remain cautious for fear of being labelled ‘neo-
Ottoman’, thus Turkey condemned the violence through the United Nations.35 In 
Turkey, there is a large community of Albanians and Bosnians;36 thus the connection 
was clear, reinforced by the fact there was the Turkic connection. Thus Turkey pushed 
for more action through the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe) meetings.37 Turkey also actively joined an arms embargo against Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to the extent the US continued its embargo, whilst Bosnia 
became a UN no-fly zone.38 
 
The Dayton agreement, which formally ended the Yugoslavia civil wars, was 
intrinsically flawed as it allowed Serb and Croat leaders to set the terms, which was 
unfair considering ethnic cleansing was part of their policies.39 Later Yugoslavia was 
placed under international sanctions, though this led to violence and a refugee influx 
into Macedonia from Kosovo.40 Many excused themselves from realising Bosnia had 
coexisted in a multi-ethnic region for centuries. However, now the violence broke out 
due to ultra-nationalistic desires.41 Progress and reconciliation would not come about 
unless the perpetrators were punished and there was a full acknowledgment of the war 
crimes.42 The policy of Turkey was to conform to what other states did; thus they had 
first recognised Yugoslavia and when it broke up, Turkey also recognised the newly 
formed successor states.43 The international commission rightly asserts the major 
mistakes of the West were the lack of understanding of the conflict, and the fact they 
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did not want to get involved militarily until the end when the US led NATO air force 
intervened.44 Thirdly, they defined the conflict as a humanitarian crisis rather than 
stating the obvious that it was blatant aggression.45  
 
 
In Kosovo, the world failed to help the people, and only at the end did NATO become 
involved by bombing Serbian camps.46 Thus it can be said the atrocities that took 
place in the Balkans in the 1990s were one of the worst episodes of ethnic cleansing 
of the twentieth century, not because of the extent of the ruthlessness to wipe out a 
people, but due to the reluctance of the world to act against the perpetrators. The role 
of Turkey was minimal even though it wanted to be more involved; as it would be 
misinterpreted by many as having another agenda. Thus, it acted through the various 
organisations, namely the UN and NATO.47  
 
Economics 
Since the end of the formal crisis in the Balkans, there is now a need to create stability 
through economic and political development. As Shasko correctly asserts, the treaties 
that were made can only be significant if the society sees the benefit in its economy.48 
Such theories of Pan-Turkism49  must be sidelined to focus on the real agenda of 
rebuilding the Balkans. In June 1992, the Turkish initiative of Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Organisation (BSEC) was formed, which included Russia, Ukraine, 
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Moldova, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and Albania.50 Its aims were to 
promote the circulation of goods, services, inter-governmental cooperation in 
transport, energy, agriculture, tourism, as well as encouraging non-governmental 
organisations too.51 This led to friendship treaties between Albania, Greece, 
Macedonia, Romania and Turkey, with joint ventures in culture, science and the 
environment.52 In 1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Summit held in 
Sarajevo was beneficial in encouraging democracy and development.53 Turkey is also 
building economic ties with Bulgaria and Albania, which is positive and beneficial for 
both sides.54 In terms of transporting Caspian energy to the West, these states are key 
to European defence and stability.55 Thus the EU should not be restrictive in the way 
it can financially support their development.56 It is a positive sign that Macedonia has 
applied to join the EU, whilst Albania and Bosnia are on the way to stabilisation and 
the Association Agreement.57 This demonstrates it had taken Europe much longer to 
lead the way in the Balkans, as up till 2003 NATO had been the policing force till the 
EU assumed this duty in Bosnia and Macedonia.58 Moreover, the military presence is 
now being used for civil purposes so as to lessen the disruption of downsizing.59  
 
It is clear the economic incentive acts for both the Balkans and Europe, as security is 
based on the stability of neighbouring states. With the possibility of oil and gas being 
transported to Western Europe, the major organisations need to keep faith with the 
                                                 
50 http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/homepage.aspx (accessed 1 September 2010) 
51 http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/homepage.aspx (accessed 1 September 2010) 
52 Shashko, 2006, 211 
53 http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp (accessed 14 September 2010) 
54 Anderson, 1996, 146 
55 Karaosmanoglu, 2006, 193 
56 Shashko, 2006, 219 
57 Cameron, 2006, 99 
58 Karaosmonoglu, 2006, 101 
59 http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15:eufor-fact-
sheet&catid=185:about-eufor&Itemid=134 (accessed 28 July 2010) 
 32
Balkan states and ease it into a new world of industrial development. Turkey’s role 
here is significant, as it can act as a bridge between East and West. Turkey can act as a 
‘big brother’ state that can help the Balkan states to emulate and learn progressively. 
This would also mean a development of democracy, which is useful for the EU 
considering the energy potential in the region. The shared regional, ethnic and 
religious factors no doubt influence Turkey’s movement and these are positive guides. 
The new regional assertiveness of Turkey is also important as it will ensure stability 
and prevent any violent conflicts breaking out.  
 
The Caucasus and Central Asia 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Empire in 1989-91, the states in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, previously belonging to the Soviet bloc, had begun to declare their 
independence by joining the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO).60 It is true 
smaller states are often more susceptible to the influence of larger states,61 and this is 
also clear in the case of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The foreign policy of Turkey 
in this region is reflective of its history as well as a need to secure energy supplies.62 
Geographically, the Caucasus has the Black Sea as its opening and Central Asia only 
has access from the Caspian Sea; thus the Caucasus would naturally orientate itself 
towards Turkey and Europe.63 Both these close regions have similar tribal style 
loyalties, with Central Asia’s ethnicity being mostly Turkic and mostly Muslim in 
religious background,64 whereas the Caucasus has a greater Christian population.65 In 
1993, these states all joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
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successor to the USSR, to ensure economic and military protection from each other.66 
In June 1992, the countries signed an agreement to assure free movement of goods, 
with Turkey taking charge of the secretariat and managing the data centre.67 It is clear 
Turkey is seeking to forge a relationship with the Caucasus and Central Asia partly for 
the sake of increasing its regional strength to enhance its importance for the EU.68 
The economic relationship that is being developed will deepen the regional 
integration and since Turkey will be a key player in achieving this, it will become the 
long term reciprocator of the benefits too. Greater regional importance would increase 
international prestige, thus strengthening Turkey’s case for its desire to join the EU. 
 
Geography 
In terms of geography, Turkey shares few direct borders and this has hindered its 
relationship with the region. Furthermore, it has allowed other regional players such 
as Iran to enter the arena,69 as Iran shares borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Turkmenistan.70 Thus, Turkey and Iran are both vying for stability and prosperity by 
exerting influence on their neighbours.71 However, it was Turkey who first recognised 
the newly formed states and established its embassies in the countries;72 a clear mark 
of Turkish intentions to build a close relationship. Armenia and Georgia are the only 
countries that border Turkey, and in August 1995 Turkey opened the Georgia-Turkey 
border gate at Turkgozu to avoid using Iranian territory for passage.73 In 1992, the 
first Turkic summit was held in Turkey with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
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Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan attending.74 Although President Ozal was hopeful and 
boasted many promises of aid and development, the result was less impressive as 
Turkey was not in a financial position to be supporting other states.75 Since Turkey 
was distant in geographical terms, it pursued other means such as communication 
with the PTT, a public sector telecommunication company that provided free public 
telephone exchanges for five of the republics.76 In Turkmenistan, forty Turkish 
companies have been established, and over seventy percent of contracts to the West 
have been taken up by Turkey.77 In 1993, Turkey was the biggest provider of 
technical and financial support to Turkmenistan, with Turkish investors settling firmly 
in the country.78 The Turkish pipeline company BOTAS has secured a long term 
contract with Turkmenistan,79 which will include 4000 km of pipelines running 
through Iran, which has been concluded with success.80 Turkey and Azerbaijan have a 
close relationship despite the distance as it has most similarity in language and 
culture.81 Thus Turkey supported the Azeris in their Nagorna-Karabagh conflict with 
Armenia.82 In 1995, Turkey created a Ministership to deal with the affairs in the 
Turkic states,83 which shows the official importance placed upon Turkey’s 
connections with the Caucasus and Central Asia. Despite all this, Russia will always 
be dominating, as all the CIS have signed bilateral security treaties with Russia.84 
Russia should not be alarmed as the export trade with Turkey in 1994 was only 2.5%, 
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a figure of $ 310.8 million, whereas export trade was around 20% with Russia.85 
Turkey has also confirmed trading deals with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, thus 
showing a steady progression in establishing a wide economic sphere for Turkey.86 In 
2001, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a long-term contract that will transport gas over 
1050 miles, with the possibility of extending it further to Europe.87  
                                                
 
All this shows Turkey’s new dynamism with inter-regional trade booming and it is 
using its geography to its benefit.88 Turkey realises there is some potential in the 
region due to the naturally rich countries. Moreover, Turkey has also been able to gain 
strength in Central Asia due to its cultural links and Turkic common factor. The CIS 
see Turkey as a model by which to progress. The fact that the Caucasus and Central 
Asian states are restricted in their water access means Turkey is a useful neighbour to 
have, thus increasing Turkey’s international credibility.  
 
The Middle East and its Ottoman Past 
It is clear past history had steered much of the modern discourse, with the Ottoman 
Empire complexes still influencing contemporary decisions. Since the 1960s onwards 
and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arab states were able to re-assess their 
position with Turkey. With pro-Islam leaders, Turkey sought more economic trade 
with the Middle East. The Gulf War strained relations due to external influences and 
pressure. However, despite this Turkey is seeking more closeness with the various 
states. The relationship will always be susceptible to weaknesses but it seems 
relations will improve over the coming years. 
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 Turkey shares borders with several Middle East countries, which in the past has led to 
irredentist claims and border disputes, namely involving Syria and producing the 
Hatay settlement.89 Since World War II Turkey has not suffered any major physical or 
human destruction,90 whilst the Middle East has been a Cold War cauldron, creating 
lasting divisions in the Arab world between the pro-Western regimes such as Saudi 
Arabia and some of the Gulf states on the one hand and the likes of Syria on the 
other.91 It is clear relations will never be fully reciprocal as both the Arab states and 
Turkey are currently pursuing strong nationalist policies.92 However, now that Turkey 
has begun to accept its own Ottoman history and is relaxed about its own position, it 
is able to re-assess its regional relations.93 The links that Turkey is pursuing with 
Israel and NATO have created suspicion from the Arab states,94 reminiscent of 
Ottoman rule over the Arabs. In the same way, Turkey has not forgotten during the 
First World War, when the Arabs revolted for their own territorial ambitions.95 Thus, 
Turkey has kept its distance from the Middle East, as history has left an uneasy 
feeling from both sides of the Middle East.96 As Robins correctly states, the way 
Turkey continues its policies in the Middle East, the Arab states will react 
accordingly.97 The Cold War was unfortunate in terms of the relations between Turkey 
and the Arab states, as some states were on the ‘opposite side’ with the Soviet Union, 
whilst Turkey aligned with the US.98 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been 
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more room to manoeuvre and relations have changed in many ways.99 The last few 
years have seen increased trade and tourism with the Middle East as a whole, with 
free visas being offered to increase tourism which promotes a better regional 
understanding.100  
 
Foreign Relations 
From the perspective of Turkey, many of its elite believe their country has a role to 
play in the Middle East through diplomacy to begin to reduce problems.101 One of the 
main approaches is by showing itself as a model by which the Arab states can 
modernise,102 though hindrances with regard to Syria are clear. Turkey has built two 
dams, the Keban in 1964 and the Karakya in 1987, which re-direct water from the 
Euphrates to Turkey.103 This has further been aggravated by the Turkish Southeast 
Anatolian Project, which has reduced the quality and quantity of water that Syria and 
Iraq receive.104 Eventually a protocol was achieved where Turkey promised to 
guarantee at least 500m³ per second of water to Syria.105 In 1996 Turkey then signed a 
military and education training agreement with Israel to which Syria felt encircled and 
led to a worsening of relations.106 By 1998, both countries were on the brink of war 
but within the same year the issues were resolved in the Adana agreement.107 Syria 
has pursued a regional tact by solidifying its relations with Egypt, and has also 
improved relations with Greece and Iran, leaving Turkey feeling threatened.108 After 
                                                 
99 Benli, 2006, 234 
100 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkeys-visa-policy-has-turkey-given-up-its-demand-
of-free-movement-in-the-eu-2010-02-14 (accessed 24 September 2010) 
101 Aras, 2005, 89-90 
102 Aras, 2005, 90 
103 Muslih, 1998, 121 
104 Barkey, 1996, 37 
105 Robins, 1991, 52 
106 Yari, 1990, 49 
107 Tur, 2006, 229 
108 Benli, 2006, 235 
 38
11th September 2001, the Middle East became the centre of attention and aggression. 
The Prime Minister Ecevit was pro-Islam and thus attempted to settle differences, to 
which Syria welcomed.109 A trade agreement was signed in 2004 which is beneficial 
for Turkey as Syria could become an outlet for exporting Turkish goods to the Arab 
world.110  
 
Turkey’s relationship with Israel dates as far back as 1950 then being the only Muslim 
country to recognise the legitimacy of the state.111 However, by 1988, Turkey also 
became the only NATO member to recognise the Palestinian state,112 thus showing 
the fine balance Turkey has been keeping in the Israel-Palestine dispute. Being in such 
a position has privileged Turkey to be one of the few to openly criticise Israel’s 
actions, such as the taking of East Jerusalem in 1980.113 Maintaining such 
connections has created suspicion from Arab states and thus relations with Turkey 
have been shallow.114 Pahlavan correctly asserts bridges can be built once the Arab 
world has a united outlook, and that Turkey’s negotiating capacity should not be 
overlooked.115 Turkey has recently shown its ability to be firm regarding the Gaza 
Freedom Flotilla killings by Israelis forces, which has severely strained Turkish-
raeli relations.116  
                                                
Is
 
Relations with Iraq are somewhat different as Iraq is land locked and thus must seek 
peaceful relations with its neighbours.117 In 1984, Iraq allowed Turkish forces ‘hot 
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pursuit’ of the PKK as both countries have sizeable Kurdish presence and both 
countries see this as potentially destabilising.118 During the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey 
acted as a transit country to Iraqi export goods to the Arab world.119 In the Gulf War 
Turkey was placed in a difficult position as to whether it should close the oil pipeline 
that runs between Iraq and Turkey.120 However, the UN had condemned the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on 3rd August 1990, which allowed Turkey to condemn Iraq with 
international backing.121 The traditional approach by Turkey has been cautious, but as 
the Gulf crisis continued, President Ozal sought to reap the benefits and allowed 
foreign bases to establish in Turkey.122 Turkey also offered its troops to protect Saudi 
rabia, but they rejected the offer, showing the old resentments were still present.123 
decision to place sanctions on Iran for continuing its nuclear programme was not 
                                                
A
 
Relations with Iran have stretched out for many centuries from the Safavid and 
Ottoman Empires, with many highs and lows. The twentieth century saw the creation 
of the republics of both Iran and Turkey, with an attempt to clearly demarcate the 
separate places of religion and the state.124 After the Iranian revolution in 1979, 
existing problems of the Kurds, Azerbaijan and Iranian immigrants were 
exacerbated.125 In 1999, there were allegations that Turkish aircraft had bombed 
Iranian soil, which led to much hype, though the matter was resolved as the 
investigation concluded it was accidental.126 As Olson rightly notes the states the 
constant bumps in relations will continue to appear and then subsume.127 The UN 
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supported by Turkey shows a new relationship is forming with Iran.128 The new joint 
venture in car manufacturing reiterates this points that Turkey is actively seeking 
better relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours.129 
 
Turkey has also extended its relations with Saudi Arabia after joining the OIC 
(Organisation of the Islamic Conference) in 1969.130 Through the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), Turkey established links and by 2003 there was $1.2 billion worth of 
trade with Saudi Arabia, with over 100,000 Turks living there.131 Saudi Arabia has 
propped itself up as the leader of the World Muslim community,132 though this has led 
to subtle clashes with Turkey, whose Muslim population are Sunni whilst Saudi 
promotes Wahabism. Moreover, Saudi Arabia also gave over $3 billion in aid to 
Central Asia, which Robins aptly characterises as ‘silent competition’ with Turkey.133 
Turkey also has trade links with Libya dating from the 1980s, with over $8.7 billion in 
trade,134 notwithstanding its partial status as a terrorist state until recently. The new 
craze of Arab citizens travelling to Turkey as a holiday destination is very apparent 
and beneficial for both Turkey and the Middle East, as it will ease tensions within the 
region and beyond.135 
 
 
To conclude, the positioning of Turkey in the world is such that it can be a great asset 
to its neighbours, especially those in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
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Constrained by geography, the states within these regions will look to Turkey for a 
water outlet for exporting their goods. This will allow Turkey to be seen as a model 
country that is on its way to establishing a balance between its secularism, religion 
and ethnic identities. Moreover, the initiatives such as BSEC and others have also 
helped the developing states in ways of economics, political maturity and technology; 
thus Turkey remains a strong regional player. The end of the Cold War helped Turkey 
to exert its influence and with the Ottoman history, religion and ethnic relationship, 
there were better chances for Turkey to aid its near neighbours. Thus history, politics 
and most importantly economics has led to the clustering of the regimes in the 
Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia around Turkey. In the case of Turkey’s 
relationship with the Middle East, this has yet to be developed on cultural terms as 
ethnically there are no connections. History has proved to be a hindrance in creating a 
willingness to build relations. Politics has been a constant problem, as notions of 
nationalism remain high in Turkey and most Middle East countries; thus it is difficult 
to extend links in this way. Iran is a strong contender for influence in Central Asia and 
with the variance in religious outlook, Turkey will most likely remain cautious of the 
moves Iran makes. With Syria, Iraq and the GCC countries, politics has also remained 
high on the agenda, as Turkey has maintained relations with Israel and has interfered 
with the flow of water in the Euphrates. However, economics through tourism has 
come to the fore and with more contracts being signed, relations will improve. 
Furthermore, as external interferences are muted, the Middle Eastern states will be 
able to engage with Turkey better. There remain many weaknesses in the new 
relationship between Turkey and the Arab world but it seems there is progress and 
once Turkey has its foot in the door, more influence will be exerted. Thus, for the 
countries that are in closer proximity with Turkey, there is more to be gained by those 
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states and Turkey, namely economically and politically. The countries more distant 
from Turkey, such as the Caucus states, do not yet rotate around Turkey and never 
will in that sense, though they are realising the importance of Turkey vis-a-vis the 
West; and it is this that will encourage greater collaboration in the future. 
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III 
Greece Leads the Way 
 
In this chapter I will attempt to make a comparison with Turkey’s ongoing application 
to that of Greece’s successful application to join the EU. This is due to the obvious 
fact the two countries share common traits both being considered from ‘Southern 
Europe’. Also, they share similar geographical strategic positioning in that they sit 
between three continents and both have Mediterranean and Balkan associations. 
However, through analysing Greece’s application process, I will show the different 
reasons for which Greece initially made the application and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) reacted positively to the application. The way Greece’s application 
was handled till it was accepted will be a key consideration with regard to how 
Turkey has been dealt with as a candidate country as it will show if there has been 
uneven enforcement of European rules for accession.  
 
The President of the Council of Ministers Ludwig Erhad proclaimed, “We see in your 
country the cradle of European culture. How then could we possibly conceive a 
European community without Greece?”1 This statement sums up the EEC reaction to 
the application of Greece in 1959 and was further supported by the Association 
Agreement, just two years after submitting the first application.2 This shows the clear 
political motives of the European states to eventually allow Greece to enter the club as 
if ‘they’ owe it to Greece. Although Greece would not accede immediately since the 
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country was economically weak, the EEC would not rule out the possibility of 
membership. 
 
Problems During the Early Years  
The 1950s and 1960s saw many structural problems in Greece, such as the clientele 
system and the blatant tax evasion meant Greece would always lag behind the big six 
EEC members until it directly addressed these problems. The dictatorship of the 
Colonels between 1967-1974 was based on direct control of the economy and this was 
a hindrance as it created superficial output numbers and was not in harmony with real 
markets.3 By 1967, there were many complaints from Norway, Denmark, Sweden and 
Holland against Greece for mistreatment, torture and clear disregard of human rights.4 
The situation led to Greece leaving the Council of Europe and the EEC application 
and financial assistance was frozen though trade continued.5 In the 1970s, Greece was 
considered to be a middle income country, with slow movement from agriculture to 
new industry.6 This was due to the new civilian government of President Karamanlis, 
which initiated a new programme of development.7 There were still problems of 
centralisation and this meant ineffective policies were causing difficulty in dealing 
with globalisation.8 The direction Karamanlis was taking was disliked by the 
populace as they saw the clear movement away from Hellenism toward the West.9 
This was necessary as Karamanlis had recognised the potential economic and political 
benefits by aligning with the EEC and NATO.10 Greece also wanted to join the EEC 
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for strategic reasons as there had been clashes with Turkey through the invasion of 
Cyprus in 1974.11 Conversely, Greece capped its expansionist ideas and had 
recognised it had to strengthen its economy if it was to challenge Turkey.12  
 
During this period, Turkey was also seeking to solidify itself through broader 
organisations such as the EEC, and from being an associate member in 1959, Turkey 
signed the Association Agreement in 1963.13 In 1975, a new radical constitution was 
drawn up with special reference to the EEC, as this took place just before official 
candidature to the EEC was accorded.14 Joining the EEC has been important for 
Greece as it was to open their economy to international markets, helping Greece to 
liberalise and establish better governance.15 Thus Greece began to reduce its inflation 
and the military spending which was around twenty five percent of the budget.16 
There was still little investment in the manufacturing industry, with much of the loans 
from the EEC going straight to private investors.17 In the field of technology, there 
had been little improvement or even desire to enhance this field, as only 2% of the 
annual budget was used for technological advancement.18 The European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) was an EEC initiative to encourage development in areas 
that would benefit from extra funding to boost development. Greece had on several 
times applied for this fund naming developed cities such as Attica for further funds.19 
It is clear that Greece intended to reap benefits after being admitted into the EEC 
while avoiding changing the deep structural problems within Greece. 
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 The 1973-74 oil shock also affected Greece significantly as the inflation increased 
back to double digits.20 During this period, the financial system was highly regulated 
with direct influence from the government; there was also increased reliance on 
foreign borrowing to support the public sector.21 This was not productive and instead 
it meant the government was cushioning the real problems. In 1975, Greece sent forth 
its application to the EEC, and perhaps the small size of Greece meant it would have a 
better chance of entering as the burden would be smaller.22 The fact the Customs 
Union was established a year prior to this shows Greece had a good chance of being 
accepted.23 In 1977 a second protocol was signed, which included financial assistance 
and abolishing duties as the ‘EC have to show it’s not just for the rich’.24 Turkey also 
signed an Additional Protocol in 1970 for the similar purpose of reducing tariffs and 
other trade barriers.25 It is interesting to note how the aim of the Protocols Turkey was 
signing was to establish the Customs Union,26 though in the case of Greece this had 
happened before the Additional Protocol was signed. The economy of Greece was 
worse than it appeared from official statistics, with consumption increasingly relying 
more on foreign imports than domestic goods.27 Competition was seen by the EC as 
useful for Greece as it would force improvements in its domestic productivity but 
instead Greece isolated large sectors and this led to decline in productivity.28 Thus in 
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comparison with Portugal and Spain, who were better economically,29 Greece was not 
the best candidate to enter the EEC; however, political considerations were always 
more important. 
 
Membership  
Of course there were many reasons for Greece to join the EEC, as Ioakimidis states, 
for Greece it meant the consolidation of democracy after the years of dictatorship and 
reducing reliance on foreign powers, namely the US.30 Membership was also meant to 
act as a catalyst for modernisation and economic gains.31 In 1979, Greece signed the 
treaty of accession and a further 19 months was given as an interim period till 1st 
January 1981 Greece became the tenth member of the EEC.32 President Karamanlis 
decided this would be the moment to choose Demotic Greek to translate the new laws 
that had to be passed, though hundreds of directives still had not been passed after the 
interim period.33 Such leniency given by the EC and the short time for Greece to 
attain full membership in comparison to Turkey’s long twenty year bid does raise 
some doubts. The new government that had been elected in 1981 was PASOK (Pan-
Hellenic Socialist Movement), was opposed to EC membership.34 After accession, it 
sought more favourable terms and Greece continued as if it had no new 
responsibilities and in 1983 when it devalued the drachma, it did not consult the EC or 
the Commission.35 PASOK maintained its rhetoric of being the people’s party, aiming 
to please the ‘non-privileged’.36 This idea of populism often occurs in periods of rapid 
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social and cultural change such as the accession to the EC.37 It was clear PASOK did 
not want to carry the burden of entering the EC as even basic taxes such as the Value 
Added Tax was only introduced in 1987 though it was originally set for 1984.38 Many 
of the liberalisation reforms that were encouraged by the EC were not adhered to by 
Papandreou’s government.39 In the case of removing tariffs they were merely replaced 
by new selective protectionist policies to the extent that by 1986 the total state aid was 
24.3% compared to the EC average of 4%.40 The general public support for the EC 
was also low and only increased when the economic benefits were becoming 
apparent.41 Foreign investment was slow as Greece had failed to implement structural 
changes whereas in Spain and Portugal investment was increasing.42 By 1985, a 
financial injection of almost 100 billion drachmas had been steadily flowing in to 
Greece till it became 30% of public investment budget, thus showing Greece was 
living off EC funds and not using the funds to make changes.43 The new IMP 
(Integrated Mediterranean Programme) was initiated by Greece as a compensation for 
the changes and financial difficulty that would be faced with integration into the EC 
for the countries in the Mediterranean.44 Greece became the largest net recipient of 
funds of all EC members and acquired a reputation as the black sheep of the 
community. Despite the net sum of 3 billion ECUs being received by Greece, there 
was little decrease in debt, inflation remained high and export performance was still 
among the lowest.45 Within Greece, large sectors such as the farmers were still not 
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being taxed and many people retired at the early age of fifty,46 which shows there was 
little will in progressing with tighter economic policies. Thus, eventually in 1984 a 
harsh austerity package was imposed upon Greece to address its dire financial 
situation. 
 
The austerity package that followed the dismal economic situation marked the first 
occasion Greece was to try to deal with the problems head on, at a time it was plagued 
by holding the highest inflation in all OECD countries.47 The programme forced a 
reduction in public debt, freeing the market from price controls, devaluing the 
drachma, and imposing wages reductions of 10-15%.48 There were to be tighter 
controls on domestic credit for both public and private sectors, which if completed 
successfully would release an EC loan of $1,750 million.49 Such harsh measures were 
disliked by PASOK and marked the beginning of the end of the PASOK government. 
Similarly, in Turkey there was an anti-EC atmosphere with the Motherland Party 
which had criticised the terms of the Customs Union.50 The Bank of Greece also 
began to move towards a market framework and it abolished credit controls and 
regulations; a positive move even though this was forced by the EC.51 Despite this 
improvement, during 1988-1994, over a fifth of cases to the European Court of Justice 
were related to Greece’s market-related infringements.52 With this said, the period 
1986-1992 was also the best period for the harmonisation of EC policies, a better 
system of justice, even though it lacked transparency and real consultation.53 The 
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second term of PASOK was thus better in terms of its financial and economic 
measures but support fluctuated as it reversed the previous promises for a better life.54 
As a result, by 1989 the upper class and middle class reverted to the ND (New 
Democracy) party led by Constantine Mitsotakis, causing the end of the PASOK 
government.55 
 
Foreign Policy 
The foreign policy of Greece since it has been accepted in to the EC has fluctuated, 
with some clear diverging viewpoints from the rest of the EC states. During the 
Falklands war (1982), Greece signed the EPC (Economic Political Cooperation) 
condemning Argentina for landing on the island, but then abstained from voting in the 
United Nations, and as Susannah Verney points out this was hypocritical considering 
the reaction to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.56 Again Greece refused to join 
the majority of EC states to impose sanctions on the USSR during its war with 
Afghanistan.57 In the early 1990s, Greece once again stood alone not to recognise the 
new state name of Macedonia, arising from the break up of Yugoslavia, arguing its 
significant closeness to Ancient Greek culture.58 Greece also refused to condemn 
Syria for attempting to blow up an Israeli airliner.59 Thus it is clear that although 
Greece was in harmony with most policies of its major political partners, it would not 
hesitate to differ in opinion. In the 1990s, Greece also took itself to task by pointing 
out the incompatibility of Turkey’s economy and political system with the then EU 
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and stood prepared to exercise its veto to prevent its rival’s assimilation.60 The irony 
is that Greece was not too long ago in a situation not dissimilar from Turkey, though 
politics overrides the fact Greece is still struggling to meet EU standards. Though 
some attempt has been made to increase links with the Balkans, it will only come to 
fruition after stability has been achieved in the region.61 Conversely Turkey has been 
more synchronised in the opinions it held in international matters. Even in the Balkan 
crisis, Turkey spoke out whilst officially being in line with the UN position. However, 
Greece has been outspoken and yet has not faced any difficulty in its international 
relations with other states. 
 
It can be summed up that the period of the 1980s marked a time which Greece fully 
realised the mixed effects of being a member of the EC. This included many benefits 
and investment, and it also meant abiding by the regulations of the EC. The early 
period was marked by a constant ignorance of or defiance in following protocol, 
whilst the second half of the 1980s forced a strong change after the austerity measures 
were put in place. There were improvements in the economy and the prospects 
seemed to improve after the elections in 1989. 
 
1990s Onwards 
The 1990s saw a better era for Greece as it strived to improve its situation. Significant 
improvement was made in the economic sphere, with stabilisation and more 
liberalisation taking place. In terms of Greek perception of having entered the EU, 
this too began to become a permanent and positive view, coinciding with the EU 
moving towards a single market and a single currency. The economic stimulus 
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provided by the Olympic games in 2004 further enhanced Greece’s chance to improve 
the structurally weak economy. 
 
Though changes were gradual, the 1990s began with more financial assistance to 
cover Greece’s debts to which the EU lent 2.2 billion ECUs with strict conditions.62 
Due to this reliance on funds from the EU, the question of Greece entering the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) had been discussed extensively. The main benefit 
of joining the EMU would be the reduction of inflation and a fixed exchange rate.63 In 
1991, inflation in Greece was at a staggering all time high of 76%, whilst the support 
for the EU was also high, which is beneficial and an important reason to push for 
entry into the EMU.64 Similarly, Turkey was also experiencing these structural 
problems during the 1970s and 1980s, but through austerity packages these problems 
were tackled head on so that by 1995 Turkey was entering a Customs Union with the 
EU.65 A key factor that has rattled Greece since the 1960s has been the lack of 
efficient taxation and coordination of the private and non-private initiatives, which if 
done would raise the revenues.66 The main weaknesses in Greece’s approach can be 
said to be the lack of unified policy with it often being defensive and reactionary.67 
These are important reasons as Greece needed to show a clear line of objectives and 
must prove they were ready in every aspect to join such an institution.  As 
Dimitrakopoulos explains this process entailed greater convergence to 
‘Europeanisation’, which can mean anything from political unification to changes in 
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external boundaries and power.68 Thus Greece had to be serious and tread carefully as 
there would be expectations to input too. With a macroeconomic stabilisation 
programme and a clear focus to reduce public deficit being pursued to meet the 
convergence criteria Greece was entering a better position to join the EMU.69 Joining 
the EMU promised to further aid the reduction of interest rates, eliminate of exchange 
rate fluctuation, thus helping fiscal consolidation.70 In 1993 the drachma was 
devalued as it joined the EMS (European Monetary System) and full liberalisation of 
capital movements, nominal convergence and development of domestic markets were 
introduced, associated with the single market.71 This shows there was a strong pro-
European attitude on the part of Greece, with a new maturity with greater involvement 
in the institutions “to regain its credibility as a reliable partner vis-a-vis the rest of the 
union.”72  
 
From 1996-2001, during the era of Prime Minister Costas Simitis, there was 
continued support for European convergence as it had now become synonymous to 
modernisation.73 There was a great reduction in the public deficit from 20% to 8%74 
and with an annual increase of GDP of 3.3%.75 This shows there was a real effort 
being made for Greece to draw level with its EU neighbours. Since the privileged 
access of government to banks was abolished in 1994, fiscal policy sharpened and the 
Maastricht agreement in 1992 lifted exchange rate controls.76 By 1999 the Amsterdam 
treaty was favoured by Greece and in 2000 polls suggested 55% of Greeks trusted the 
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EU.77 Thus despite some tough decisions being forced upon Greece in the 1980s and 
1990s, this continued level of support shows Greeks realised the lasting benefits of 
being part of a large political and economic institution. Greece realised better reforms 
will create a better position for Greece within the EU and thus in the international 
sphere.78 Though there still needs to be greater decentralisation, transparency, and 
independence within the Greek institutions,79 there has been significant improvement. 
A continued effort with creating new think tanks, discussion groups and greater 
development of the private sector will help the overall performance of Greek society 
and its economy.80 
 
Since the 1980s Greece has employed a more positive attitude towards the EU and 
this maturing of behaviour has helped accrue more funds for the country.81 After the 
Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties, which emphasised environmental policies, Greece 
created new ministries for planning, housing and the environment.82 This shows an 
understanding of what the outcomes of the EU are as well as active participation 
towards those goals. Though there is some stubbornness from Greece having 
constantly vetoed Turkey’s application until 1999, it has created a perception they will 
only accept Turkey if this means compensatory benefits. Failing to support fellow 
countries beyond conditionality is a weakness in international relations and should be 
examined to allow greater flexibility.83 Some such as Tsoukalis have argued Turkey’s 
application is problematic due to its religious fundamentalism, and military 
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involvement in politics.84 It is unfair to decide a country’s weakness should become 
the basis of rejection, as clearly Greece’s weak position was one of the main reasons 
to allow it to enter the EU, to act “as a catalyst for domestic reform/modernisation.”85 
Furthermore, as Papademos states, allowing Greece to enter the EMU was a way to 
force change by having to coordinate with set principles and rules.86 Greece’s 
performance is yet sluggish in terms of growth as inflation is still too high as the 
figures suggest that in 2010 deficit will be around 10% of GDP.87  
 
History Repeating 
The recent crisis that Greece has entered can be seen to be a repeat of the situation in 
the 1980s but with wider implications upon EU countries. The crisis also highlighted 
other issues, namely the position of Greece in the EU, as some have begun to point 
out clear discrepancies such as the fiddling of numbers to enter the EMU as noted by 
Traynor.88 The budget deficit of Greece was 12.7%, almost four times the permitted 
level of the EU, which was due to constant over borrowing.89 As Connolly correctly 
asserts, the situation was a ‘self-made crisis’ and now the rest of Europe will have to 
help Greece lift the burden before the crisis leads to the collapse of the Euro.90 This 
new national debt of €300 billion clearly meant a new bail out was to be created; 
however, this stirred contentions between Germany, which does not want to be the 
main burden carrier and France, which has openly come to the rescue of Greece.91 
Rather Germany has insisted on a first time austerity package led by the IMF 
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(International Monetary Fund), European Central Bank and the European 
Commission.92 Other options that have been presented include devaluing the 
currency, though this cannot happen due to the single currency of the Euro.93 The EU 
has pressured Greece into introducing heavier taxes, adding an extra 12 pence on 
petrol.94 The fact is Greece has never taxed well with evasion being rampant; even 
now the average restaurant owner pays €4000 in tax, whilst a lawyer pays out only 
€10,000.95 In this regard, Turkey has done better, as the negotiation process shows it 
has aligned well in the chapter on Taxation.96 By April-May of 2010, plans for €4.8 
billion austerity package for Greece had been widely spoken of, which included a 
huge reduction of civil servants.97 Duty would also be increased on luxury items, 
alcohol and cigarettes by 10%98 and VAT from 21% to 23%.99 The bailout by the 
three major players will add up to €140 billion; the largest international bail-out 
ever.100 In the midst of all of this, some are sceptical that although the huge financial 
aid will help Greece with its debt, it would not encourage any permanent structural 
change.101 On May 18th 2010, Greece was provided with guarantees for the delivery 
of €110 billion over a three year period to assist in the payment of government bonds 
as they matured.102 The same day a deputy minister of culture and tourism resigned 
after her husband had evaded €5 million in tax, as both had filled out the tax reform 
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form.103 This is not helpful news as it only reiterates the concerns of many as to the 
depth of sincerity Greece is putting in to alleviating the situation. On June 24th 2010, 
Greece announced preparations it was making in selling and offering long-term leases 
on hundreds of islands in an attempt to raise funds to alleviate the debt.104 The 
investment is to lead to new jobs and capital or as Makis Perdikaris, the Director of 
Greek Island Properties said, “The point is to get money.”105 
 
To conclude, though the examination of Greece’s application has been brief some 
interesting and clear conclusions can be made. Since the application of entering the 
EU in 1959, Greece has been given preferential treatment in the way it has continued 
its bid, during its accession and after becoming a member. From the onset, Greece 
would always be treated differently as Ludwig Edhard clearly said Greece had a 
special and permanent place in the EC. The EC maintained relations if even at a 
distance and felt it had to show itself to be welcoming of poorer nations to prevent 
exclusivity based on wealth. For Greece, there were incentives to keep close to the 
European power, as Turkey which militarily was much stronger, had already attacked 
Cyprus and threatening in the Aegean, and so Greece needed to create strong allies. 
Thus for both the EU and Greece, membership was based on political motives as a 
primary reason. Economics was also important; however as Greece was accepted for 
membership by 1979, the problems lay unaddressed as it took over nineteen months 
till the actual agreement was signed. Thereafter, the move for change was still slow 
and even several laws pertaining to the EC were not passed through parliament. By 
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1984, the situation was clear; Greece had not modernised and yet had been over 
spending to a point where the EC had to bail the small country out. The cut backs 
were harsh and helped Greece back on its modernisation track. The point to be 
realised is the way in which Greece was aided in its current financial crisis shows the 
extra care with which the EC treads. Harsh measures may have been in place, but it 
still did not lead to a questioning of the lack of benefit Greece has brought to the EC. 
Nor did it structurally change the core problems within Greece, as after twenty five 
years the same problem occurred with greater consequences. The entry into the EMU 
has been argued by some to be a bad mistake, as no country should enter the EMU if 
its track record is weak or to use the EMU to stabilise itself. Greece did not qualify in 
the first wave of single currency applicants but was admitted in the second wave after 
it cooked the books to make it appear it had met the convergence criteria when it had 
not. To compare this situation with Turkey there are some clear differences and 
similarities. Turkey’s desire to enter the EC was based on a political desire to 
Westernise, though the EC looked to Turkey in an economic perspective. The yard 
stick applied to Turkey’s application was longer and harsher as the dates for 
Association Agreement, Customs Union and accession negotiations show. Thus 
Greece’s application into the EU was easier than Turkey’s application so far since the 
reasons for entry and the EC’s perspective favoured Greece more than Turkey. 
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IV 
THE PROSPECT OF TURKEY ENTERING THE EU 
 
 
This chapter will explore the positive qualities and benefits Turkey’s possesses as a candidate 
country. It can be said that too often the focus has been on Turkey’s apparent inability to meet 
entry conditions, always falling short of the benchmark set by the EU or the artificial 
conditions some member states have sought to attach to its case. However, due recognition 
should be given to the many positive qualities Turkey can use in its favour to continue 
negotiations, even speeding them up to reach the destination of membership. This chapter 
will be split into three sub levels; the first addressing the issue head on by providing some 
estimates given by analysts as to accession dates for Turkey whilst also examining the chapter 
negotiations. The chapter negotiations will explore those that have been opened and are either 
closed or reaching closure, as well as those chapters which will remain closed for reasons that 
will be explained. The second sub level will discuss the key aspects of Turkey’s bid to 
become a member, briefly showing the benefits membership can provide for Turkey itself. 
The final sub level will analyse the prospective benefits of such a country acceding based on 
the needs of the EU.  
 
Chapter Negotiations 
Having read through the ‘European Voice’ from the beginning of Turkey’s negotiations in 
2005 up till the present date, it has become clear that most of the articles regarding Turkey 
evince a positive tone. Indeed, several columnists speculate as to possible dates for entry 
within the European Union; for example Martin Banks has agreed with ‘optimists’ that a time 
scale of at least ten years will elapse till Turkey completes negotiations.1 David Cronin’ 
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reiterated the foreign minister Joschka Fischer’s estimate as to Turkey’s entrance into the EU 
involving 10-15 years.2 By contrast other sources are pessimistic: some have categorised 
Turkey’s bid as ten years good behaviour followed by ten years of negotiations.3 This shows 
the general view with regards to Turkey’s entrance into the EU is at least ten years and 
possibly a maximum of twenty years away. 
 
The records of the negotiations that have been under way between Turkey and the EU since 
2005 provide some interesting insights. First the chapters that are open will be discussed 
followed by those chapters waiting to be opened and those closed for reasons that are 
somewhat external and indirect influences. 
 
In December 2004, the European Council voted on the application of Turkey to become a 
member of the European Union with a good majority of 407 in favour, 262 against and 29 
abstaining.4 The Council recognised Turkey’s weaknesses but decided to press ahead with 
negotiations in 2005. It was made clear that Turkey could not become a member until the 
current absorption of the ten new members took place properly5 and the 2014 EU long term 
budget was planned.6 Though this seemed abrupt, later a Pre-Accession Assistance package 
was prepared for candidate countries, to ease the alignment process, with Turkey receiving    
€11, 468 million for the years 2007-2014.7 Amongst the first chapters to be opened and 
closed provisionally was that of Science and Research, which took place in June 2006.8 In 
November 2006, the European Commissioner Olli Rehn commented on Turkey’s progress, 
affirming the continuation of negotiations but at a slower pace due to the laxity in 
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implementation.9 The following March, the chapter on Enterprise and Industry was opened 
and in June of the same year the chapters Financial Control and Statistics were opened too.10 
By December, the chapters on Trans-European networks, and Consumer and Health 
protection were opened for negotiations.11 In 2008, a revised accession partnership was 
created to review progress so far. It concluded there were improvements in the legal 
framework as well as implementation, but the fact Turkey had refused to its open ports to 
Cyprus, thus not complying with the Additional Protocol, meant eight chapters would remain 
closed.12 The eight chapters included Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and 
Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.13 This was a serious 
setback for Turkey as it decreased support for the country’s bid in the EU as well as leaving 
little room for manoeuvre in other chapters. Despite this response from the EU, a further two 
chapters of Intellectual Property and Company Law were opened in June 2008.14 In June 
2009, the chapter on Taxation was opened and in December the chapters on Environment and 
Free movement of Capital were opened too.15 In June 2010 the chapter on Food safety, 
veterinary and Phytosanitary policy was opened.16 Thus in five years a total of thirteen 
chapters have been opened and if this is used as a basis to predict the opening of the other 
chapters, it will take approximately another ten years to conclude negotiations. This does not 
include the fact many chapters are very difficult to resolve such as Cyprus, moreover France 
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has implied it will make the closure of chapters difficult.17 The EU have also made it clear 
that if Turkey fails to upkeep the conditions of the Copenhagen criteria, negotiations will end 
and new conditions will be set for resumption.18  
 
There are several reasons for the slow negotiation process of chapters being opened or even 
closed. These shall be discussed outlining some of the general and specific hindrances on the 
part of member states or the EU in general. 
During the negotiations leading to the Accession Partnership between the EU and Turkey, 
several voices within the EU were calling for a ‘Christian culture’ as a pre-condition.19 
Though Brussels rejected this condition it nonetheless it showed the incoherence in outlook 
from the EU members. Furthermore, Turkey is faced with the difficult situation of choosing 
who to please within the EU, as all states have the right of veto, including stark opponents of 
Turkish admission such as France, Austria and Cyprus.20 In 2005, Turkey was scolded for 
adding an additional declaration to a protocol so as to abrogate parts of the Customs Union 
concerning Cyprus.21 Another article explained the postponing of voting by MEPs on the 
Customs Union, as a punishment for Turkey’s closure of ports to Cypriot vessels; to which 
Turkey retaliated by stating it would only open ports if Cyprus stopped vetoing aid for 
Northern Cyprus.22 This disagreement arose since Turkey had signed the Customs Union 
which clearly provided access to ports by all countries including Cyprus, though, as Muftuler 
Bac states, some EU states are using this to hide their prejudices and delay negotiations.23 
The Progress report of 2009-2010 clearly states that the following chapters would not achieve 
acquiescence until Turkey resolved its issue with Cyprus. The chapters that remain closed are 
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free movement of goods, Financial services, Fisheries, Transport policy, Customs union and 
External relations. Moreover, France has also voiced its determination to keep five chapters 
closed as it states these will only be relevant once Turkey gains membership.24 This seems 
quite strange as the point of the chapters for negotiations is for candidate countries to align 
with EU regulations before they join. This places doubt over France’s real motives to stop 
negotiations, which has been made clear on several occasions with President Sarkozy 
remarking, “I do not think that Turkey has a place in Europe.”25 As recently as May 2010 the 
European Commission announced it would meet in June to discuss the Lisbon treaty as it 
may be able to go around Cyprus’s veto since MEPs have now been granted powers of co-
decision.26 This would help Turkey with the blocked chapters, whilst predictably, Cyprus is 
unhappy with the situation as it sees it as tacit recognition of the TRNC, and so plans to 
challenge in the European Court of Justice.27 So far, the question of trade with the EU has 
currently been passed to the European Parliament who will then make the final decision on 
the matter.28 
 
It can be seen that the EU is in a complex situation, wavering between keeping its image as a 
fair institution whilst its member states have abused the rights granted within the EU to 
pursue their individual goals. This means Turkey is playing a dangerous game to keep on the 
favourable side of members within the EU. In a poll surveying EU people’s view on Turkey 
becoming a member, around 47% oppose to their possible membership.29 Thus the EU cannot 
be ready until it has more support from the people within the EU.30 Since each state has a 
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different perspective on what the chapters mean, negotiations will inevitably be long and 
arduous.31 Moreover, it has been pointed out that the term and idea of negotiations is 
questionable. Since all has been previously defined, it is merely a matter of time to adjust to 
the obligations set out.32 Therefore it is clear Turkey will find difficulty opening and closing 
chapters due to the opposition from some member states.  
 
Of Turkey for Turkey 
This section will consider Turkey’s development over the last seven to ten years, exploring its 
many improvements along the way that have resulted in creating positive attributes for 
Turkey as a state.  
 
In 2004, the European Commission noted the strong economic growth of Turkey despite the 
sharp output contraction during 1999 and 2001.33 The Commission stated Turkey had made 
improvements in its institutional and regulatory setup, with the essentials having been put 
into place.34 In 2004, inflation had reduced significantly, with stricter fiscal policies being 
applied and greater transparency in the public sector.35 With the abolition of the death penalty 
in 2002 and limiting the powers of the National Security Council, Turkey was praised for its 
radical reform packages.36 The Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), submitted by 
Turkey, and launched in 2004 was aimed at strengthening macroeconomic stability and 
ensuring sustainable growth.37 Through private consumption and domestic investment, 
Turkey experienced a boom in 2004,38 which confirms the trend of more liberal encouraging 
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of economic growth.  Turkey also met its target in the general budget deficit of 4.4 % in line 
with the agreement set by the IMF.39 The Central Bank of Turkey, by lowering interest rates 
helped to reduce the inflation which was drastically reduced from 11.8% to 5.3%40 and 
through greater independence from the state it achieved greater credibility.41 The Progress 
report in November stated Turkey was fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria adequately, having 
improved its ability to take on obligations and was thus given ‘transition assistance’ of €256 
million, €702 million, and €720 million to continue these efforts.42 Turkey also became the 
third country to join the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) which meant 
Turkey was able to emulate best practise from EU member projects.43 Considering Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) account for 30% of the Turkish economy,44 this was very 
beneficial and showed Turkey would use this information to its advantage. Being attached to 
such projects in formal ways highlights Turkey’s desire to be recognised for its efforts. 
Furthermore in international relations, the European Commission “applauded the steps that 
Turkey took” with regards to normalising relations with Armenia.45 The strategic importance 
of Turkey has also been recognised by the EU, as “the EU and Turkey share essential 
strategic interest e.g. in security, economy and dialogue of civilisations.”46 Thus the energy 
supply would build Turkey’s capacity to develop its energy market whilst becoming a key 
transit country for Europe. The Progress Report 2009-2010 outlined some key developments 
in Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. With regard to Freedom of 
Religion, it noted Turkey’s change to incorporate non-Muslims foundations into the care of 
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the Ministry of Religious Affairs as ‘smooth’.47 A major step was the announcement of a TV 
channel that would broadcast twenty-four hours a day in the Kurdish language.48 In 
international relations, the European Commission praised Turkey for its peace mission efforts 
in neighbouring regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus and in Africa too.49 Furthermore, the 
fact Turkey had ratified the Kyoto agreement demonstrated the seriousness of Turkey’s desire 
to conform to international standards.50 Thus it is clear from the many reports of the 
European Commission that Turkey has been progressing in the right direction during the last 
six years.  
 
The history of the Turkish Republic rising from the Ottoman Empire has taken on the trait of 
always looking towards Europe.51 As Ulusoy mentions, this European influence is beneficial 
as it dismantles old coalitions and creates a new brand of institutions and a fresh method of 
decision-making.52 This brief section will explore the secondary research into the progress 
made by Turkey in its desire to become a modern state. 
 
Since 1964, Turkey has had programmes with the IMF, with neo-liberal reforms beginning in 
the 1980s, 53  and it was only in the 2000s that longstanding problems such as high inflation 
and debt were structurally controlled and reduced.54 Following the crisis in 2001, the IMF 
created a $19 billion package, through which the BRSA (Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency) would ensure implementation; Turkey was praised for its rapid 
recovery.55 During this period, the European Commission stated Turkey had begun a reform 
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that was the result of a bottom up approach to bringing about change,56 clearly showing 
recognition by the international world. A key factor in the rapid progress in the last decade is 
the strong single party majority of the AKP in parliament, as this naturally leads to a stronger 
ability to commit to reforms.57 A major amendment to the constitution was the supremacy 
given to European and International conventions over Turkish domestic law.58 As Nihat 
Gultekin and Kamil Yilmaz assert, Turkey is now mature enough to experience 
modernisation, with the “EU membership as a further catalyst for change and reforms”.59 
Another clear positive aspect of the new AKP government is the platform of dialogue they 
have created between the state and Islam, thus also developing civil society by fostering a 
national spirit.60 As Kotsovilis notes, this has led to a rise of the under represented groups,61 
and has created a stronger Muslim brotherhood that has been likened to providing a model for 
the Middle East.62 The release of Leyla Zena and other Kurdish activists from prison 
demonstrated a unity in Turkish society and a development in outlook.63  
 
Being near over 70% of the world’s oil and gas reserves means Turkey will take the 
opportunity to maximise the benefits of becoming a transit country for these energy 
resources.64 The dreamed Nabucco pipeline, which will cross from the Caspian Sea to Austria 
and Turkey, will help to diversify the gas supply, breaching Russia’s monopoly, providing up 
to 31 billion cubit metres a year, 65 with the possibility of a joining pipeline from Egypt.66 
Becoming a transit country for Europe means Turkey will gain substantial income whilst also 
                                                 
56 Ulusoy, 2009, 376 
57 Bird, 2009, 147 
58 Webber, 2003, 90 
59 Yilmaz, 2005, 61 
60 Turam, 2007, 135 
61 Kotsovilis, 2006, 57 
62 Turam, 2007, 154 
63 Ulusoy, 2007, 476 
64Williams, 2009,  341-342 
65 Taylor, European Voice, 17-23 July 2008, 21 
66 Taylor, European Voice, 29 January-2 February 2009, 17 
 68
being able to satisfy its own domestic needs, which is always key. As Toby Vogel notes, the 
EU should be prepared to deal with a more assertive Turkey that has a clear strategic vision 
and has begun to recognise its place within its region and the world.67  
 
Being strategically placed between Europe, the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Middle 
East has lent Turkey the obvious advantage in being a part of various coalitions and key 
organisations such as NATO, BSEC and ECO.68 Joshua Walker comments interestingly on 
Turkey’s positioning, as he analyses Turkey’s previous inward looking nature pre-World War 
II, to a new reassertion as a regional player.69  This new regionalism has been actively 
encouraged by Chief Foreign Policy Ahmet Davutoglu advisor to Erodgan, through economic 
ties to strengthen the region, 70  whilst using the also using strength of the past.71 As part of 
this policy, trade with Syria has increased by 30% with Iraq by 60%, clearly demonstrating 
Turkey’s encompassing vision.72 Turkey has also been busy in promoting reconciliation, by 
leading talks between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and after months of diplomatic 
efforts Boris Tadic, President of Serbia attended the memorial at Sebrenica and condemned 
the infamous massacre perpetuated during the recent civil wars.73  
 
Thus it is clear Turkey has increased its capacity to act as a regional leader through trade, 
promoting democracy and fostering better relations. This was achieved after having become 
stable in its internal matters of monetary and fiscal policies, establishing firm structures that 
were followed through. This encouraged the strengthening of civic society and opened an 
arena for dialogue between all sections of society. The natural allies in the region, Turkey has 
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been able to develop key pipelines that will be for domestic consumption as well as carrying 
energy supplies forward to Europe. All this has placed Turkey in a central position of being 
recognised as an active player in acquiring its interests whilst also developing the capacity to 
the same for other countries. 
 
Turkey For the European Union 
Turkey is also an important asset for the EU, as it has been able to exercise its influence in 
areas the EU has not been able to exert its power. This section will explore the various 
reasons why Turkey is considered vital for the EU as a fully fledged member. Most 
importantly Turkey has clout in its economy, its geo-strategic positioning, and military 
strength. 
 
In 2009, the General Report of the European Commission stated the EU accession “provided 
a strong incentive for Turkey to advance to democracy and human rights and continue 
modernising.”74 This is supported by the continual emphasis in the progress reports that 
Turkey has a functioning market economy.75 Moreover, the impact of Turkey joining the EU 
would be positive as there has been strong alignment in the economic sphere. 76 In addition, 
with the increasing openness of the economy, this is an incentive for foreign investors to 
come to Turkey for trade.77 With EU trade standing at 48% of GDP in exports in 2008 this 
shows Turkey is able to trade at a competitive level.78 Advanced legislation in fields such as 
the Free Movement of Goods is promising and should be taken into account despite the 
current lag in implementing these reforms.79 In the negotiations chapter of Enterprise and 
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Industrial Policy there has been progress with new strategies and improvement in enforcing 
this shows Turkey will become a key member.80 In Social Policy and Employment a 
parliamentary commission on equal opportunities was set up to ensure men and women are 
treated equally and reduce the polarisation of the labour force.81 The removal of tariffs on 
industrial goods after accession would mean increased trade, within the European economic 
area and this is important for both the EU and Turkey.82 The signing in 2009 of the 
intergovernmental agreement of the Nabucco project signifies a joint venture and evidences 
progress in working together for mutual economic benefit.83 This means Turkey can become 
important in helping to diversify the sources of oil and gas for the EU.84 
 
“The EU and Turkey share essential strategic interests” is a statement that typifies the 
crystallising relationship that is forming between the EU and Turkey as it is one of mutual 
interest.85 The EU will be able to come in to close contact with parts of the Middle East 
through Turkey, who will be able to promote ideas of democracy and help stabilise key 
energy regions.86 Turkey’s impressive military capacity of over 739,000 military personnel, 
the second largest standing army in NATO, has served in many regions and can significantly 
boost the EU’s security policy.87  
 
Thus it is clear Turkey offers many benefits should it become a member of the EU. Stronger 
policies will enable other foreign investors to invest and create businesses in less saturated 
areas. The energy sector is one of special interest and if the Nabucco project is completed it 
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will clearly demonstrate the necessary point of Turkey being a transit country and a member 
of the EU.  In the military sphere too, Turkey is unrivalled in its experience in working with 
neighbouring countries to ensure peace. Being a full member will mean the EU will benefit 
from added security. 
 
Exploring the secondary sources concerning the benefits of Turkey for the EU, it seems there 
is corroboration with the aforementioned reasons in the primary sources. These sources do 
also mention some pertinent points with regards to the set up of the EU, which will be 
discussed. The military and economic factors have contributed to being key reasons for 
expanding the current relationship between the EU and Turkey. 
 
International structuralists assert external influence is amongst the most forceful reason to 
anchor a country’s desire to establish democracy.88 ‘We have a moral obligation to keep the 
door open for further enlargement’, ‘deals must be respected’ and ‘we must be consistent’, 
are key statements made by the EU which indicate recognition of the potential Turkey 
holds.89 Muftuler Bac discusses some of the possible reasons the EU will consider Turkey as 
a member; he proposes firstly, the material benefits and costs of Turkey; proposal two is 
based upon the logic of appropriateness considering the European culture idea; and the third 
proposition is looking at the internal dynamics of the EU in this current period.90 All three 
viewpoints show hesitation in absorbing Turkey into the EU, but in principle the EU has 
argued ‘unity in diversity’, with all cultures being celebrated.91 The economic benefits would 
also be high, for when the tariffs and other trade barriers are removed, EU companies will 
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have access to millions of potential new customers.92 Moreover, once the corruption 
perception index is improved the GDP of Turkey will increase by 5-6%,93 and Turkey will 
contribute around 1.2% of its GDP to the EU budget.94 Furthermore, the planned project of 
irrigating 3.6 million hectares of land by 2030 would mean greater export and domestic 
consumption.95 An important step in showing a desire to assist Turkey in this respect was the 
announcement in 2009 that the EU will provide €250 million96 to jump start the Nabucco 
project, whilst the EIB offered a €2 billion loan to help finance the project.97 It is perhaps for 
this reason France announced it would open the chapter on Energy during its EU presidency 
rotation.98 The ten year ‘Agenda for culture’ initiated in 2007 will encourage a greater 
understanding between the varying cultures within the EU, and will prepare the EU for 
accepting new members who do not share the supposed ‘Christian’ culture some opposers 
promote.99  
 
Turkey is also a key regional player and closeness to Turkey would be beneficial for the EU, 
most importantly since its soft power approach would be strengthened. Turkey borders many 
developing and unstable regions such as the Balkans and the Middle East. For this reason, the 
EU could strengthen its Eastern flank by tasking Turkey with border control and such related 
issues.100 With regards to Iran and its desire to pursue nuclear energy, the big EU-3 (Great 
Britain, France and Germany) have not been able to create a firm stance.101 This weakness in 
a collective security policy is confirmed by the lack of any documents to deal with such 
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matters. Thus with Turkey present, their experience can help coordinate policies.102 With 
Turkey being a long standing NATO member and having established relations with the US, 
Turkey can also become the bridge to unite the European and American members of 
NATO.103 The new civil code that has become approved by the Copenhagen criteria will 
enable Turkey to truly be a model for the Middle East, promoting the compatibility of 
democracy and Islam.104  
 
It is clear there are many issues affecting the EU’s process towards accepting Turkey as a full 
member. The internal dynamics within the EU and Turkey are currently being redefined; thus 
there is unease in the relationship.105 Since Turkey was portrayed by some as the ‘Other’ for 
historical reasons, this has meant the EU has first had to settle this matter.106 The only way to 
do this would be to accept Turkey, as this would also strengthen of the image the EU. The 
additional economic benefit of securing some of the EU’s energy would enhance Turkey’s 
chances of membership. The military knowledge and experience that Turkey offers would 
hugely benefit the EU and help it to assume a greater position in regional politics.  
To conclude, Turkey has been in the negotiation process for over five years and progress in 
reform has been uneven. This has partly been due to the hindrances caused by external 
influences such as France and the dispute with Cyprus, causing blocking of chapters. 
Turkey’s own inability to be consistent in implementing reforms has also aggravated the 
situation. The lack of cohesion displayed by the EU through the actions of its member states 
weakens the credibility of the EU and perhaps explains the lag in reform by Turkey. That 
said, Turkey has overwhelming benefits on offer for itself and for the EU through full 
membership; thus it cannot be pushed to the side. Turkey’s strong economy and tight fiscal 
                                                 
102 Kibaroglu, 2006, 178 
103 Atasoy, 2005, 189 
104 Mousseau, 2006, 104 
105 Albert, 2009, 223 
106 Albert, 2009, 223 
 74
policies that are in place means it will remain stable and continue to grow. The statistics and 
many EC reports affirm this progress too. Reforms in all sectors of society from law, 
administration, and freedom of religion, make clear Turkey is serious about pursuing its 
intention of membership. Attachment to various international institutions gives added 
strength to Turkey’s desire to be among the leaders in world politics. Turkey’s energy 
potential makes it a powerful energy corridor, thus strengthening its case. Being strategically 
placed and having experience of the region enables Turkey to calculate and deal with 
situations better than most. As a specific benefit for the EU, Turkey has its growing economic 
strength to prove itself and the fact Turkey has not yet reached its potential means the EU can 
become the main recipient of these escalating benefits. The energy sector is only one known 
part the EU can benefit from as other sectors can be developed to provide such benefits. 
Being a known regional player, the EU can be reinforced on the Eastern side, as well as 
becoming a bridge for communication and promotion of key values such as democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights. Thus the estimates given by analysts of 10-15 years as a 
minimum seems a good approximation and some developments within the EU suggest some 
better progress. One of the most important points that should be remembered is Turkey’s 
changing society. This is important as a new generation will develop, encouraging the 
continuation of reforms, offering the prospect that any negative aspects of Turkey will soon 
be ironed out, or at least outweighed by the positive aspects which are becoming more 
apparent as reflected by Turkey’s elevation to a major tourist destination.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
To bring this research to a conclusive end the four chapters will be summarised briefly 
whilst attempting to answer the initial questions posed at the beginning of the 
investigation into Turkey’s application for EU membership. Chapter I discussed the 
many problems faced by Turkey especially during the 1980s and 1990s that led to a 
slow progression in its hope for membership. Factors such as the strong military 
presence prevented Turkey from being seen as a fully fledged liberal democracy as 
the military interference was felt and seen through the coups and the NSC. However, 
the current role of the military has been limited through several reform packages and 
most importantly through the recent referendum, which has allowed the possibility of 
trying coup leaders in civilian courts.1 The Kurdish situation was once unspeakable 
but since the internationalising of the domestic issue, it has become recognised that 
Turkey has moved away from violent containment to wilful engagement. This has 
been seen through the permanent airing of Kurdish television as well as the economic 
commitment to the Southeast, thus showing societal development on the issue. The 
issue of human rights is also being dealt with and it is becoming apparent that Turkey 
is not alone in this weakness, though it has progressed a long way. Recognising this 
weakness was one of the first steps to tackle the problem of infringing the basic right 
of every human. Relations with Greece were also once a major problem, however, 
through confidence building measures, there has been less contention regarding the 
Aegean or any islands. The maturity of both countries as well as the encouragement 
from the international community has been vital in achieving better relations. A major 
worry was the burden of the Turkish economy on the EU; this thought has been 
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mostly dispelled. With a booming economy, strong in FDI and national practises 
being improved, the EU looks to gain much from this structurally sound and 
functioning market economy. The only issue that remains is that of Cyprus and this 
can only be cleared through the EU asserting itself stronger in its negotiating capacity. 
Although the Annan plan did not work due to obvious reasons, this effort needs to be 
continued to settle the many years of strife for the islanders and regional 
disagreement. 
 
Chapter II looked into the regional capacity of Turkey in the Balkans, Caucasus, 
Central Asia and the Middle East. Within the Balkans, it is clear the historical 
connection was most felt and for this reason Turkey was limited in its options to 
intervene during the 1990s since notions of Pan-Turkism was being associated to any 
gesture towards the region. However, it sought to establish economic ties with success 
and this has led to better regional politics as well being a model of Western 
democracy. The Caucasus always had better economic chances due to its energy 
capacity, thus Turkey has been proactive in establishing ties despite the geographical 
distance. The Nabucco project is one such endeavour that has connected Europe with 
that region through the intermediary of Turkey. With regards to the Middle East, 
Turkey has had to accept its own Ottoman past before engaging on a meaningful level 
with the Arab states. Acute issues such as the water dispute with Syria or its relations 
with Israel have led to a wariness of Turkey’s motives. With the recent conflict in Iraq 
and Palestine, Turkey and the Arab states have been able to reassess and reassert their 
positions. Thus Turkey has adopted a ‘zero-problem’ policy with its regional 
neighbours and this has led to increased tourism, trade and established friendly 
relations. Thus, to answer question three of the investigation, ‘Should Turkey become 
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a member of the EU?’ the answer would be yes. This is because Turkey has much to 
offer, most importantly to become a role model and mediator in the relations between 
the ‘West’ and the ‘East’. Turkey’s softer approach to presenting democracy would be 
grasped better by the regional states and encourage further dialogue. Pursuing the 
economic policy combined with politics has worked well for Turkey. Turkey has 
come to realise its neighbours cannot be ignored for the sake of Western orientation, 
but rather engaging with them on a regional level has increased Turkey’s own 
standing in the European and international sphere. Backed with military might, 
Turkey can become a strong Southern flank to contain any threat if need be, though its 
diplomatic means would always be exhausted first. 
 
Chapter III analysed the journey of Greece, becoming an EU member in 1981, despite 
its many weaknesses and few strengths. The comparison was made as there were 
similarities such as the geostrategic positioning of both countries. Moreover, both 
states experienced economic problems and structural weakness, though Turkey 
eventually dealt with its problem before acceding to the EU. The political motivations 
were greater than other states which have joined, and thus played a major factor in 
preparing Greece for eventual membership. Despite the interventions made by the 
IMF during the 1980s to reform Greece’s ill fated economy, Greece has yet again 
made the same mistakes and suffered harsh austerity programmes; this time to limit 
the potential damage caused to the EU as a whole. Thus to answer question four 
‘Should the EU accept Turkey as a full member?’ the answer is yes. The reasoning 
behind this is simply if Greece can enter based on its criteria and state of affairs in 
1979, Turkey has more right to enter now with its reform process increasing 
constantly. Turkey has more to offer economically than Greece, being a major 
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exporter of fruit, nuts and vegetables. Furthermore, in military means and in a 
political context too, Turkey has a larger clout of influence which it can use to ensure 
the stability of the region. Since the recent conflicts in the region and the example of 
the 1990s, Turkey can become an important military ally in more concrete ways 
through the EU, thus strengthening the capacity of the EU and developing its military 
aspect. 
 
Chapter IV assessed the current situation Turkey is faced with after being accepted in 
2004 for accession negotiations. This is a very positive step as it partly answers the 
first question posed ‘Will Turkey enter the EU?’ The EU cannot say no, which leaves 
much room for hope and development of Turkey’s standards to conform to EU 
standards. If it is assumed the EU did continue negotiations to finally accept Turkey 
as a full member, the question of when this would happen could then be posed. Thus 
the time frame upon possible accession ought to be discussed. Having reviewed the 
opinions of analysts and viewpoints of EU member states and others, it would seem 
the best estimation for Turkey’s accession would be around 2020. This is because the 
EU at present is evolving and whilst deeper integration is the focus, the new states 
will establish their place within the EU. Thus, if they desire a fellow ‘South-eastern’ 
state who could balance the power dynamics in the EU, then this will be favourable to 
Turkey. The main benefit Turkey has to offer the EU is perhaps the new regional 
leadership it has taken on. Based on internal economic stability, Turkey is able to 
penetrate its region through economic and political means to enhance its reputation 
whilst benefiting from regional stability. Furthermore, when assessing the future of 
Turkey’s position within the EU, it should be remembered the EU will be very 
different in its outlook over the next ten years. Thus, the current decision by France 
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and Austria to hold referendums in their respective countries may or may not hold 
great importance. EU legislation is constantly changing as the issue of Cyprus 
blocking EU aid to Northern Cyprus has shown and over the next few years the option 
of qualified majority voting may be used on all major issues, such as the accession of 
Turkey. The development of Turkey will also be interesting to see as the present 
situation forecasts a more stable, economically flourishing, vibrant societal based 
Turkey to which the EU cannot refuse entry. This is believed on the obvious 
assumption Turkey will continue to develop in all aspects including legislative, 
societal and legal. Thus it can be concluded the idea of Turkey entering the EU is not 
a step too far but a step that has taken too long to achieve and the current trend of EU-
Turkey relations is the right course of direction. 
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Appendix I 
 
 
 
• Figure 1 Map of the European Union ‘Map of European states’ 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/europe_map.htm (accessed 25 September 
2010). 
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Figure 2 Map of the Balkans 
 http://lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/balkans.jpg (accessed 25 September 2010)  
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Figure 3 Map of the Caucasus and Central Asia 
http://www.jozan.net/maps/caucasus_cntrl_asia_pol_00.jpg (accessed 25 September 2010) 
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Figure 4 Map of Middle East   
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-192062619-middle_east_pol_2008.jpg 
(accessed 25 September 2010) 
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Appendix II 
Table 1 GDP of Turkey and Greece 
 
Date   GDP  Turkey GDP Greece 
2006   $402,709,900,000.00    $244,951,400,000.00   
2005   $363,369,600,000.00    $225,206,300,000.00   
2004   $302,678,300,000.00    $209,109,900,000.00   
2003   $240,375,800,000.00    $175,556,100,000.00   
2002   $183,888,300,000.00    $135,029,100,000.00   
2001   $145,243,600,000.00    $119,109,400,000.00   
2000   $199,267,300,000.00    $114,601,000,000.00   
1999   $183,823,400,000.00    $122,707,900,000.00   
1998   $199,633,800,000.00    $124,648,900,000.00   
1997   $189,164,600,000.00    $124,025,300,000.00   
1996   $181,051,100,000.00    $127,109,800,000.00   
1995   $169,318,500,000.00    $120,152,100,000.00   
1994   $129,734,000,000.00    $102,353,400,000.00   
1993   $179,408,200,000.00    $95,512,780,000.00   
1992   $158,890,300,000.00    $102,022,300,000.00   
1991   $150,765,400,000.00    $92,295,010,000.00   
1990   $150,641,900,000.00    $85,929,070,000.00   
1989   $107,029,800,000.00    $69,494,750,000.00   
1988   $90,102,280,000.00    $66,942,350,000.00   
1987   $86,927,860,000.00    $57,630,100,000.00   
1986   $75,596,730,000.00    $49,490,020,000.00   
1985   $67,237,680,000.00    $41,977,300,000.00   
1984   $59,895,990,000.00    $42,152,050,000.00   
1983   $61,517,750,000.00    $43,388,930,000.00   
1982   $64,389,470,000.00    $47,943,880,000.00   
1981   $66,455,470,000.00    $45,950,190,000.00   
1980   $70,903,190,000.00    $49,884,890,000.00   
1979   $88,093,060,000.00    $47,824,290,000.00   
1978   $66,561,960,000.00    $38,860,850,000.00   
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 1977   $61,088,410,000.00    $31,755,780,000.00   
1976   $53,306,790,000.00    $27,346,080,000.00   
1975   $46,479,220,000.00    $25,040,380,000.00   
1974   $37,338,190,000.00    $22,253,410,000.00   
1973   $27,100,420,000.00    $19,616,800,000.00   
1972   $21,545,090,000.00    $14,821,590,000.00   
1971   $17,098,680,000.00    $12,809,090,000.00   
1970   $17,875,390,000.00    $11,534,090,000.00   
1969   $20,306,670,000.00    $10,276,880,000.00   
1968   $18,168,330,000.00    $9,044,548,000.00   
1967*   $8,334,468,000.00   
1966*   $7,713,171,000.00   
1965*   $6,933,215,000.00   
1964*   $6,093,739,000.00   
  1963*   $5,427,087,000.00   
1962*   $4,859,789,000.00   
1961*   $4,575,618,000.00   
1960*   $4,056,104,000.00   
* No data found for these years for Turkey 
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